The Conference Board
Governance Center Blog
NOV
20
2014
by
John C. Wilcox, Chairman, Sodali
To demonstrate their effectiveness,
corporate boards should increase transparency, provide an annual report of
boardroom activities and take charge of their relations with shareholders.
With shareholders continuing to press for
ever-deepening levels of engagement, companies must find a way to answer
the most basic question of corporate governance: “How effective is the
board of directors?” It is a question that can only be answered by
the board itself, but it presents directors with a challenge as well as
an opportunity. The challenge is to overcome the mindset, habits and
perceived risks that have long kept boardroom activities under wraps. The
opportunity, on the other hand, is to define governance and strategic
issues from the board’s perspective, manage shareholder expectations, take
the engagement initiative away from shareholders and reduce the likelihood
of activism. Directors should give careful consideration to this
opportunity. Over the long term, it will be far better for companies to
control the process by which board transparency is achieved rather than
waiting for yet again another set of governance reforms that could further
erode the board’s authority.
Despite widespread support for board primacy
and the board-centric governance model, boardroom transparency and
director-shareholder relations are not a priority at most companies. A
recent
DealBook column in the New York Times described the situation as
follows:
“What if lawmakers never spoke to their
constituents? Oddly enough, that’s exactly how corporate America operates.
Shareholders vote for directors, but the directors rarely, if ever,
communicate with them.”
The problem is not limited to corporate
America. Opaque boardrooms are a global phenomenon, particularly common in
markets where companies are dominated by founding families, control
groups, or the state.
The column concludes:
“…[S]ome form of engagement with shareholders
– rather than directors simply taking their cues from management – would
go a long way toward helping boards work on behalf of all shareholders…”
[Andrew Ross Sorkin, The New York Times, July 21, 2014]
Cues from management are not the only concern.
In many global markets the board’s role is broadly defined, requiring
directors to balance the competing demands of insiders, resolve conflicts
of interest, deal with related-party transactions and juggle competing
business and public policy goals in addition to their basic
oversight duties. In these markets the need for transparency is even more
compelling than in highly regulated markets, such as the UK, the European
Union and the USA, where comprehensive legal, disclosure and
accounting standards are well established.
Boards are under pressure…
Pressure for greater board transparency and more open
communication continues to come from the usual suspects: activist
investment funds, hedge funds with a range of long and short-term
investment strategies, governance reform professionals, NGOs, shareholder
advocacy groups, trade unions, individual shareholder activists, special
interest proponents and other adversaries. Proxy advisory firms compound
the pressure by providing a global audience for these disputes. When
issues of policy are involved, the media and politicians often step in to
further amplify the pressure on companies.
Companies have fought defensive rearguard
actions against activism, occasionally prevailing in specific
campaigns, but ultimately they have had to concede defeat on most policy
disputes relating to governance and board accountability. The decade-long
evolution of the say-on-pay vote exemplifies this pattern of opposition
and retreat.
Despite the chain of losses, the high-volume
debate between companies and shareholders about the merits of governance
reform continues today: Are corporate governance standards good or bad for
companies? Does shareholder activism produce value or destroy value?
Should shareholders have more power or less? Are directors sufficiently
independent or not? Should corporate governance be director-centric or
shareholder-centric? Is chronic short-termism the fault of greedy
shareholders, or greedy CEOs, or weak boards, or does it represent the
inevitable decline of free-market capitalism, or all of the above? The
list of questions goes on and on. The debate has not lessened in
intensity, but it has not resolved the questions either. The few answers
that have been provided remain largely determined by research
methodologies, policy perspectives or the merits of individual cases. The
real answer to most of the big questions seems inevitably to be “It
depends…”
As 2015 approaches, it remains unclear how
much the debate really matters or whether answers to these questions would
be helpful to businesses and investors. For individual companies, the
answer would seem to be No.
…but institutional investors are under
pressure, too.
Today’s governance and regulatory environment is changing rapidly for
shareholders and the investment community as well as for companies. In the
extended wake of the financial crisis, institutional investors
remain under the regulatory microscope. They can no longer claim
privileged status or remain exempt from the governance and accountability
standards they impose on portfolio companies.
Stewardship codes and new laws in several
major markets now require institutional investors to intensify
their oversight of portfolio companies and disclose publicly their
governance policies, voting practices and engagement activities. These
requirements have further led to the development of new means of
collective institutional engagement through organizations such as the UK
Investors Forum.
Proxy advisory firms, themselves under
regulatory and industry pressure to provide less standardized
governance reviews as well as more information about the integrity of
their research and vote recommendations, are relying much less on their
traditional check lists of governance externalities. In response to client
demand, they are digging for more detailed information about board
effectiveness at individual companies.
The financial crisis awakened the investment
community and the general public to the failures that resulted from overreliance
on quantitative analysis to evaluate companies’ performance and risk. In
response to new rules, institutional investors are now beginning to
include intangibles and non-financial performance metrics in
their analytical models. This wider lens embraces corporate governance,
environmental practices, social policies, ethics, culture, reputation and
other non-quantitative elements that are predictive of long-term
performance. The terms “ESG” (Environmental, Social, Governance) and
“sustainability” have become a form of shorthand for defining this new way
of looking holistically at business enterprises. A recently issued
Directive on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by the
EU Council puts the legal imprimatur on this broader set of data.
The enlarged analytical framework has
important implications for companies — and specifically for boards of
directors. Responsibility for ESG and sustainability falls squarely on the
board. The directors, rather than management, are deemed by shareholders
to be answerable for ESG and sustainability.
Investor focus on non-financial criteria is
producing some interesting results. In the U.S., the Council
of Institutional Investors and its members have taken an approach that
involves a carrot rather than a stick. CII has begun publishing periodic
reports, based on member surveys and feedback, identifying companies
whose disclosure practices exemplify best practice. A February 2014 CII
report named six U.S. companies — Coca-Cola, GE, Pfizer, Prudential
Financial, Microsoft and Walt Disney — as examples of excellence in
disclosure of director qualifications and skills. In September 2014 CII
published an additional report on board evaluation practices, citing GE
(USA), Potash, Agrium (both Canadian companies), BHP Billiton (Australia),
Dunelm (UK) and Randstad Holdings (Netherlands) as examples of excellence.
According to deputy director Amy Borrus, CII plans to continue publishing
reports on issues deemed important for its members to evaluate board
effectiveness.
Organizations in other jurisdictions have also
begun to identify companies with excellence in ESG/Sustainability and
board communication. The annual UK ICSA Excellence in Governance Awards
are a prominent example.
Transparency instead of engagement
Companies’ efforts to deal with activists tend to focus heavily on
engagement (i.e., letters, meetings and outreach campaigns). However,
engagement is reactive and does not establish a long-term basis for
preventing activism. Companies seeking to reduce confrontation with
shareholders in the future should look for strategies that
preempt activists and forestall engagement rather than erecting more
defenses.
Board transparency is surely the most
effective form of prevention. Providing information about what the
board is doing and why its decisions are aligned with business goals is
the most direct means to avoid the shareholder misperceptions and
discontent that can lead to activism.
Board transparency has long been acknowledged
as the essential board accountability mechanism for companies in
jurisdictions that rely on voluntary, principles-based, comply-or-explain
governance systems. Admittedly, the comply-or-explain process is far from
perfect. Explanations are mandated only where companies are
non-compliant with governance principles, encouraging a narrative that can
be haphazard and unrelated to other disclosures. The European Commission
has been aggressively vocal about the poor quality of companies’
explanations and has threatened regulation to compel better results. Even
when companies are diligent, a system designed on an exception basis will
encourage piecemeal, ad hoc communication rather than a coherent
narrative.
Lopsided communication also results from
mechanisms such as the say-on-pay vote. Companies are obligated to prepare
lengthy and detailed explanations in support of the complex remuneration
programs that are now standard around the world. In addition to being
burdensome to both companies and investors, this type of
excessive regulatory micromanagement can distort board function by
shifting directors’ attention to a particular issue of importance to
regulators rather than letting the board set its own priorities based on
business considerations.
A more coherent and self-directed approach to
board transparency would enable companies to avoid these problems.
Transparency — defining the board’s
responsibilities
A board seeking to increase transparency should begin the process by
clearly differentiating its role from that of management. The first step
is to articulate the board’s specific tasks and responsibilities
separately from those of the CEO and management. This division of
responsibilities is already implicit in today’s global
corporate governance principles. Essentially, the board of directors is
responsible for its statutory duties plus ESG and sustainability, while
management is responsible for everything else – day-to-day business
operations, financial performance and the execution of strategy.
Affirmation by companies of this allocation of responsibilities would by
itself go a long way toward defining the scope and limits of board
transparency.
Enumerating the board’s specific tasks does
not mean that one size fits all. Each company needs to carefully review
what its board does and compile a list of responsibilities that takes into
account the history, culture and characteristics of the enterprise as well
as regulatory requirements. Lists will be different for companies
in different jurisdictions and with different profiles — dispersed
ownership, family or group control, IPO companies, mature companies,
state-owned enterprises, privately held companies, and so forth. But at a
minimum, board responsibilities will include the following:
-
Long-term strategy, company values, culture
and “tone at the top”;
-
Oversight of management and long-term
performance;
-
Accounting principles and the audit process;
-
Policies relating to ESG and sustainability;
-
Director nomination, selection and
competence;
-
CEO succession planning;
-
Board evaluation;
-
Executive and board compensation;
-
Risk oversight;
-
Ethics, conflicts of interest and
related-party transactions;
-
Non-financial performance goals and metrics;
-
Engagement and communication with
shareholders and other constituents.
Differentiating the board’s role from that of
the CEO and management is more than a mechanistic exercise. It establishes
an important principle for board transparency: There are limits to the
topics that directors can discuss with shareholders. By contrast,
there are no such limits (other than legal and regulatory) applicable to
topics that the CEO and executive management can discuss with
shareholders. If companies respect this principle, they will eliminate
most of the risks associated with transparency because the dreaded
“material, non-public information” will generally not be the subject
matter of board communications. Problems related to duplication, leaks,
market confusion, selective disclosure and unfairness will be unlikely to
arise if directors articulate these limits and require shareholders to
respect them.
Transparency — an annual board
narrative
Given the board’s acknowledged primacy – its governing position at the top
of the business enterprise, its fiduciary duties and its statutory role as
the shareholders’ elected representative body — the absence of an annual
written report from the board is an anomaly. If the buck stops with the
board, shouldn’t the directors be obligated to explain their actions?
Assuming that “director-centric” is the preferred governance model, why
is there no requirement for an annual report from the board?
Director-centric does not mean “No questions asked.” Even the business
judgment rule – the keystone of board authority — should encourage
transparency rather than silence. An annual narrative describing the
policies and decisions of the board and its committees should be the sine
qua non of director-centric corporate governance.
If an annual board report were to be required,
its content and scope should be defined — but not dictated — by the
board’s enumerated responsibilities. The narrative “story” should
otherwise be free form. In some cases the board might describe how its
committees and governance policies work in the business context. In
other cases, the story might focus on an extraordinary business
transaction or on the board’s strategic vision. The story might give extra
attention to controversial issues, such as compensation, where the board
wants to explain a divergence from standard practice. The storyboard for
directors should be as varied as the business conditions and issues faced
by the companies they oversee. The essential point is that the board
itself should decide what story it wants to tell.
The quality of a board narrative should be
judged by its impact. Is it clear? Does it tell a compelling story
about board effectiveness? Does it reveal a commitment to the company’s
business goals and sustainability? Are the shareholders convinced?
“Director Relations” – a practical
approach to board engagement with shareholders
In addition to providing a written annual report of its
activities, the board should have an independent voice and the means to
exercise it.
A company planning to have its board meet
directly with shareholders or participate in an engagement campaign should
ensure that the process is planned, initiated and controlled by the
company, not by shareholders. The agenda for meetings should be set by the
company, not by shareholders. In most cases the board’s purpose in meeting
with shareholders should be for the directors to listen and learn rather
than to debate.
A company may decide to go further and
establish a formal program for conducting periodic
board-shareholder engagement. In that case, the first step is to make sure
that opening boardroom windows won’t reveal internal problems. To ensure a
clean house, the board should review the results of its annual evaluation
and take steps to implement any meaningful recommendations. If an annual
board evaluation process is not already in place, the board should
initiate one. Shareholders have come to view regular board evaluation as
an important accountability mechanism for the uniquely self-administered
powers of corporate boards.
The board should commission independent
experts to conduct a governance benchmarking and perception survey that
examine the company’s governance profile, competitive standing,
reputation, risk factors, media coverage and other relevant measures of
shareholder satisfaction with the company’s board of directors,
executive leadership and strategic direction.
The board should also be given access to the
company’s information and databases that relate to share
ownership, investor profiles and the views of institutional portfolio
managers, financial analysts and governance decision makers. Voting
results, contacts with activists, feedback from the annual general meeting
and other shareholder and media commentary should be summarized for board
review.
Armed with these resources and information,
the board will then be in a position to determine whether engagement is
necessary and, if so, to address the logistical questions of organizing a
campaign: What topics should be on the agenda? Who should speak for the
board? With whom should the board engage? When should engagement occur?
Who from management should participate? The answers to these questions
will vary, but they should be worked out in advance by the board in close
collaboration with management.
Director relations programs are an aspiration,
not a reality. Over time, however, as board transparency increases and
companies become more comfortable with dialogue between directors and
shareholders, such programs are likely to emerge. A few conceptual models
for administration and logistics are worth considering:
-
Holistic Investor Relations. A
management-led IR team can incorporate governance, environmental,
sustainability and other board issues into an integrated IR program
addressed to an expanded institutional investor audience of governance
and voting decision-makers as well as analysts and portfolio managers.
Directors can participate as needed, but they receive regular IR/ESG/sustainability
feedback. Proviso: the effectiveness of this model relies on the
willingness of institutional investors to integrate financial and
non-financial metrics into their investment decision-making models.
-
Institutional Investor Relations. An
expanded office of the Company Secretary, Board Secretary, or
Corporate Governance Officer, within the management’s budget, can be
charged with a mixture of board and management administrative duties
that combine board-shareholder communication and engagement together
with such related duties as organization of the annual meeting, proxy
solicitation, regulatory filings, disclosure and compliance.
-
Director Relations. The company can set up
an independent department dedicated exclusively to serving the
board. With its own budget and staff, reporting to the board and serving
its committees, the Director Relations office would provide
administrative support for internal activities such as director
selection, board evaluation, compensation policy, D & O insurance and
other ad hoc board projects, as well as external communications and
engagements with shareholders. It would also organize the retention of
independent experts to advise the board as needed.
There can be many variations on these
configurations that take into account the unique characteristics
of individual companies and the issues facing their boards.
CONCLUSION
Although global corporate governance standards continue to uphold the
director-centric model, information about board effectiveness remains
fragmentary and inconsistent. Both companies and shareholders
would benefit from an annual board narrative and a structured program for
directors to communicate and engage with shareholders.
About the
Guest Blogger:
John Wilcox,
Chairman, Sodali |
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John C. Wilcox is Chairman of Sodali Ltd, a global consultancy
providing companies and boards with services relating to corporate
governance, shareholder relations, corporate actions and the capital
markets.
From 2005 to 2008 he served as Senior Vice President and Head of
Corporate Governance at TIAA-CREF, one of the world’s largest private
pension systems. Prior to joining TIAA-CREF he was chairman of Georgeson &
Company, the U.S. proxy and investor relations firm.
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