MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
Appraisal Arbitrage—A Rising Star in
the Activist Playbook
Shareholder activism gains momentum and
publicity with each passing proxy season. Activist-focused funds
increase capital and investor expectations, proxy contest tactics
become more practiced and skillful, nominees for board positions are
industry tailored and more sophisticated and social media increases
the reach (and entertainment value) of activist communications. What
comes next? Appraisal rights as arbitrage.
Appraisal rights are a state statutory
remedy available to dissenting shareholders in extraordinary corporate
transactions. The rules vary from state to state, but the most common
scenario in which appraisal rights are used is a cash merger where
objecting shareholders seek a court's separate assessment of "fair
value" for their shares. Under Delaware law, appraisal awards accrue
statutory interest at the federal discount rate plus 5%, compounding
quarterly from the transaction closing date until the award is paid.
And, absent bad faith, the interest rate is paid regardless of the
ultimate appraisal decision. In evaluating appraisal claims, Delaware
courts also have wide latitude; they may consider "all relevant
factors" in determining value, often relying on expert opinions and
factoring in complex variables such as future projections, expected
tax rates, equity risk premiums, control share premiums, and discount
rates.
Historically, appraisal actions in
connection with M&A transactions were uncommon, typically only filed
by disgruntled shareholders. But, increasingly, activist funds are
exercising statutory appraisal rights in public company transactions
in order to maximize return—either by obtaining a court ruling that
dissenting shareholders are entitled to additional consideration in
excess of the deal price, by settling the claim, or by collecting the
simple return generated by the statutory interest rate applicable to
these claims.
Here is how the "arbitrage" works.
Beginning in 2007, the Delaware Chancery Court's Transkaryotic
decision made it clear that any beneficial holder with shares held
through Cede & Co. (also known as DTC, the clearing house for US
stock) could seek appraisal rights regardless of when the shares were
acquired, provided that the total number of dissenting shares was less
than the total "street name" shares not voted or voted against the
deal. Accordingly, investors can now determine, based on market
reaction to a deal and applicable disclosure in proxy or similar
materials, whether or not to "buy into" appraisal claims. In addition,
the interest rate applicable to such claims, particularly in our
current low interest rate environment, is a reliable offset to the
risk and cost of an appraisal action. Notably, it also serves as an
additional point of leverage in settlement discussions with target
companies.
Going forward, appraisal rights will be a
considerable factor in deal risk and related litigation. Data from
Delaware's Chancery Court reveals a clear trend—i.e. a significant
increase in the number of appraisal actions filed. From 2009 to 2012,
the number of filed claims was 16, 18, 20, and 21, respectively. That
number jumped up to 35 in 2013. And so far in 2014, 20 appraisal
claims have already been filed. Not only is the rate of claims on the
rise, but so too is the use of their strategic force. For those who
followed the recent Dell or Dole Foods management buyouts, the use of
appraisal litigation (or at least its threat) was a major force in
public resistance to the transactions and, potentially, a major
windfall to the investors who exercised their right to have a court
independently determine the value of their shares.
Appraisal rights are not an easy, quick or
affordable remedy for all shareholders. Claims often take years to
resolve and dissenting shareholders must pay their own fees while
taking the risk of a court determined value (note that in some states,
a court may actually determine fair value to be less than the deal
price). Appraisal rights also ensure a level playing field for
minority shareholders that may be harmed in an "insider" deal
negotiated at a lower than "market" price. The market must now
consider, however, if the advantage afforded to large (and possibly
opportunistic) activist funds is fair or appropriate as compared to
smaller holders with fewer resources.
All M&A practitioners are well advised to
consider the impact of appraisal claims on public company
transactions, particularly those, like management buyouts, that may be
subject to heightened scrutiny regarding valuation. Both buyers and
sellers are likely to focus on closing conditions tied to the number
of shares subject to appraisal, a feature not common in today's public
deal agreements, as weighed against the potential hold-up value
provided to activist funds looking to capitalize on arbitrage
opportunities. It is also worth noting that many practitioners view
this appraisal arbitrage as pure rent-seeking and, therefore, have
initiated a call for legislation to limit the available statutory
interest (particularly in cases where the appraisal value is set at or
lower than the deal price) and/or to eliminate the ability to "buy
into" an appraisal claim following announcement of the transaction.
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