Reforming the Delaware
Law to Address Appraisal Arbitrage
Posted by Wei Jiang, Columbia Business
School, on Thursday, May 12, 2016
Editor’s Note:
Wei Jiang is Arthur F. Burns Professor of Free and Competitive
Enterprise at Columbia Business School. This post is based on an
article authored by Professor Jiang;
Tao Li, Assistant Professor of Finance at Warwick Business
School; Danqing Mei, Ph.D. candidate in Finance at Columbia
Business School; and
Randall S. Thomas, John S. Beasley II Professor of Law and
Business at Vanderbilt Law School and Owen Graduate School of
Management. This post is part of the
Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are
available
here. |
The number of appraisal petitions has
increased from a trickle of cases in early 2000s to over 20 a year in
recent years, or close to one-quarter of all transactions where
appraisal is possible, or appraisal eligible deals. After years of
being infrequently deployed and largely overshadowed by shareholder
class actions in Delaware and other states, the contours of the
appraisal remedy are suddenly front page news as some Wall Street law
firms seek to cut back on appraisal arbitrage filings. These firms are
petitioning the Council of the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware
State Bar Association (the “Council”) and the Delaware legislature to
raise the bar for shareholders eligibility to file appraisal petitions
and to make its terms less attractive in an effort to curb what they
perceive to be a new form of strike suit. Echoing this view, Delaware
Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III commented in Merion Capital v.
BMC Software, Inc. (2015) that dissenters of valuation were
“arbitrageurs who bought, not into an ongoing concern, but instead
into this lawsuit.” Shareholder advocates, on the other hand, are
arguing in favor of expanding the appraisal remedy in order to fill
perceived gaps in investor protection that are alleged to have
surfaced as Delaware and other states have cut back on judicial
protections for minority shareholders in change-of-control
transactions.
After
weighing the arguments made by both sides, the Council has proposed
two important reforms in 2015: a required minimum required stake of $1
million or 1% of the stock of the company for which the petitioner is
seeking appraisal (the “De Minimis Exception”), and reductions to the
statutory pre-judgment interest rate paid on the amount awarded in an
appraisal proceeding (the “Interest Reduction Amendment”). Our
article,
Reforming the Delaware Appraisal Statute to Address Appraisal
Arbitrage: Will It Be Successful?, which was recently made
publicly available on SSRN, examines the empirical underpinnings of
these proposed reforms to inform the ongoing debate about reforming
the Delaware appraisal statute. This first large-sample empirical
analysis of appraisal arbitrage is based on a manually collected
comprehensive sample of all appraisal eligible deals and appraisal
petitions from 2000 to 2014.
First, hedge
funds dominate the appraisal arbitrage strategy, accounting for
three-quarters of the dollar volume involved in all appraisal
petitions in recent years. The top seven hedge funds file petitions
accounting for over 50% of the dollar volume and the top seven law
firms representing them are named in about 50% of all the cases.
Petitioners’ stake size is highly variable, with a median of $1.9
million, although about 32% of the cases involve stakes that are both
below $1 million and 1% of the stock of the company.
Second,
appraisal petitions target deals that have potential conflicts of
interest. Going private deals, minority squeezeouts, short-form
mergers (and other second-step transactions) after tender offers are
each associated with a significant 2–10 percentage point increase in
probability of an appraisal filing, a substantive magnitude given the
all-sample average probability of 6.9%. Relatedly, low takeover
premiums are an invitation to appraisal arbitrageurs, other things
equal: for every 10 percentage point decrease in the deal premium, the
probability of an appraisal increases by 63–72 basis points.
Next, the
study provides direct evidence to assess the potential impact of the
De Minimis Exception. Using the $1 million and 1% of outstanding stock
as the cutoff for “large-stake” petitions, we project that the number
of appraisal petitions will drop by about one quarter if that reform
is enacted, assuming that the in-sample relation between deal/firm
characteristics and the filing of appraisal petitions remains
constant. However, the same restriction will not affect shareholders’
motives for seeking appraisal because the underlying motives bear a
stronger statistical relation to large-stake petitions than to
small-stake ones.
Moreover,
confirming the common wisdom, we find that most (80.1%) of the
petitioners settle. Notably, the petitioner stake size is the single
most powerful predictor of whether a petition will go to trial: the
probability increases by 14.7 percentage points if the petitioner’s
stake exceeds $10 million. Interestingly, a low cutoff at $1 million,
as suggested by the De Minimis Exception, would have no impact on the
likelihood of a case going to trial. Instead, a cutoff closer to $5
million would be necessary to make a significant impact.
As to the
Interest Rate Reduction, our study affirms the widely held belief that
a significant part of the increase in appraisal petitions has been
driven by the lucrative yields provided on the awards in these cases.
For every percentage point increase in the yield that arbitrageurs
obtain in excess to their alternative risk free investment (e.g.,
treasury bills with comparable duration), the probability of an
appraisal filing increases by about 1.3 percentage points. This
implies that the 5% statutory rate above the risk free rate, on its
own, has triggered 6.5 percentage points of additional appraisal
filings among all eligible M&A deals, or almost 45% of the actual
appraisal petitions filed. Such a finding strongly supports the
Interest Reduction Amendment as a way of discouraging interest rate
driven appraisal cases.
Finally, we
note that the Council’s decision not to propose legislative overruling
of the Transkaryotic decision, perhaps because of the
Delaware Chancery Court’s statements that they will defer to the deal
price in M&A transactions negotiated in arm’s length transactions,
appears prudent. Larger shareholders that file appraisal petitions are
generally motivated to do so because of perceived conflicts of
interest, and these transactions are the least likely to be negotiated
at arm’s length. If the appraisal remedy is designed to address
“unfair” prices in M&A transactions, then the Delaware appraisal
statute will still be available in those circumstances.
The full
article is available for download
here.
Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
All copyright and trademarks in content on this site are owned by
their respective owners. Other content © 2016 The President and
Fellows of Harvard College. |
|