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The Shareholder Forumtm

special project of the public interest program for

Fair Investor Access

Supporting investor interests in

appraisal rights for intrinsic value realization

in the buyout of

Dell Inc.

For related issues, see programs for

Appraisal Rights Investments

Fair Investor Access

Project Status

Forum participants were encouraged to consider appraisal rights in June 2013 as a means of realizing the same long term intrinsic value that the company's founder and private equity partner sought in an opportunistic market-priced buyout, and legal research of court valuation standards was commissioned to support the required investment decisions.

The buyout transaction became effective on October 28, 2013 at an offer price of $13.75 per share, and the appraisal case was initiated on October 29, 2013, by the Forum's representative petitioner, Cavan Partners, LP. The Delaware Chancery Court issued its decision on May 31, 2016, establishing the intrinsic fair value of Dell shares at the effective date as $17.62 per share, approximately 28.1% more than the offer price, with definitive legal explanations confirming the foundations of Shareholder Forum support for appraisal rights.

Each of the Dell shareholders who chose to rely upon the Forum's support satisfied the procedural requirements to be eligible for payment of the $17.62 fair value, plus interest on that amount compounding since the effective date at 5% above the Federal Reserve discount rate.

Note: On December 14, 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision above, encouraging reliance upon market pricing of the transaction as a determination of "fair value." The Forum accordingly reported that it would resume support of marketplace processes instead of judicial appraisal for the realization of intrinsic value in opportunistically priced but carefully negotiated buyouts.


 

 

It should be noted that the link to Dell's March 29, 2013 preliminary proxy statement in the article below is to a version of the filing that is posted on Dell's website* to open to the section referenced in the article. The document is different from the version provided publicly on the company's "Investor" website for "SEC Filings," shown here:

Filing Date Document Date Type Description Filer Downloads
03/29/13 03/29/13 PREM14A A preliminary proxy statement relating to a merger or acquisition   Download SEC Filing to HTML Download SEC Filing to Word Download SEC Filing to Excel Download SEC Filing to Adobe PDF XBRL SEC Filing Unavailable

* http://i.dell.com/sites/doccontent/corporate/secure/en/Documents/20130329_PREM14A_Final.pdf#page=53

 

Source: The Wall Street Journal MoneyBeat, April 30, 2013 commentary

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  |

  MARKETS & FINANCE

 

 


2:21 pm
Apr 30, 2013       
Deals

Dealpolitik: Bridging the Dell Divide

 


 

 

Dell is a tale of two companies. Dissident shareholders including Southeastern Asset Management and Carl Icahn believe Dell shareholders should have an opportunity to hold on to at least some Dell stock. They may not quite think it is the best of times for Dell, but they are concerned that the cash-out sale to Michael Dell and Silver Lake will deprive them of substantial upside as operations improve in the future.

From the perspective of the special committee of Dell, it appears to be the worst of times for Dell, and shareholders would be best off taking the$13.65 per share in cash offered by Silver Lake the company’s CEO and run before things get worse. The special committee apparently thinks Dell is broken in several significant ways. It has been largely vindicated in its view that management does not have a good handle on the numbers. When Blackstone left the scene, it pointed to Dell’s cutting its operating income projection for this year by 19%.

But the inability to forecast the declining results is just the tip of the iceberg for the Dell special committee’s concerns about Dell. Take a look at the factors the special committee considered relating to Dell’s business in determining to approve the Silver Lake deal.

They consist of almost four pages of bullet points listing business problems for Dell. They range from the fundamental changes in the PC market to “the risks and challenges inherent in executing the Company’s long-term business strategy” to “the Company’s slow progress to date in implementing changes needed to execute” its strategy “and the Special Committee’s uncertainty as to the Company’s ability to fully execute this strategy.…”

The Dell stock dipped below $9 in November, before rumors of the buyout surfaced and the special committee is probably worried that shareholders could be in for a rude awakening if they turn down the Silver Lake deal.

Dell shareholders are thus faced with a stark contrast in views as to what they should do about the deal. If they buy the Southeastern view of the world they should probably vote down the deal and perhaps insist on a standalone recapitalization or Icahn’s proposed transaction which would give them cash for some of their shares and while still allowing them to retain a substantial equity interest in a more leveraged Dell. The special committee says vote yes because that is the best solution to what seems to appear to them to be a broken company.

Is there any way to bridge this gap? There might be. What Southeastern and Icahn have said is that they want is shares in the continuing corporation. But Michael Dell has said that he thinks Dell’s problems can best be addressed with Dell as a private company without the need to report financial results quarterly. And the experience of Mr. Dell and Silver Lake so far on the transaction in terms of having to deal with an independent committee and complex procedures used to protect minority shareholders probably has made them even more convinced that if the deal goes forward they want to end dealing with Dell as a public company.

But if shares of Dell are issued in the deal to the public (or remain outstanding), Dell would almost certainly continue as a reporting company.

However, there is one mechanism that could be used to address the Southeastern and Icahn concerns which might be able to be structured so as not to require continued public company reporting.

Silver Lake and Mr. Dell could incorporate a “contingent value right” or CVR into the consideration shareholders receive. A CVR is just a fancy name for the right to receive additional consideration down the road if certain things happen. For example, if in the next several years Dell were sold, a significant dividend were paid or there were a public offering and the amounts involved exceeded specified thresholds, the CVR could provide that former Dell shareholders would receive an additional payment.

The SEC has said under certain circumstances CVRs will not be treated as a security and therefore burdensome disclosure requirements can be avoided. If the CVR qualifies for this treatment, there should be a strong argument that Dell would not be subject to the normal public company disclosure requirements merely because of the CVR.

However, in order to qualify for this treatment the CVR would need to meet certain criteria, including that it be non-transferable. In some interpretations issued by the SEC, it has also indicated that the CVR cannot be dependent on the operating results of the target company.

If Silver Lake were to offer a CVR, the thresholds which would trigger a payment could be set at a level which would not interfere with normal LBO equity returns, but still provide Dell shareholders with reassurance that if Mr. Dell and Silver Lake hit a home run with the deal Dell former shareholders could participate in some of the upside.

Although CVRs are not common, they have been used to bridge gaps in value, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry where there can be significant uncertainty as to the prospects for a drug in development. The most prominent recent use was in 2011 to resolve Sanofi’s months long hostile takeover battle to buy Genzyme, where ultimately Sanofi paid $74 per share in cash and a CVR providing for payment of up to an additional $14 based on whether specified drugs met certain milestones. Those CVRs trade on an exchange and currently have a market price of about $1.70. A non-transferable CVR was used in the 2011 acquisition of Clinical Data by Forest Laboratories for $30 per share plus a CVR worth up to $6 based on a drug’s performance over a seven year period.

None of the parties has yet publicly broached the idea that a CVR would satisfy its concerns. Indeed it is possible with the bad news Blackstone has highlighted, Silver Lake may be interested in paying less, not more, for Dell. And don’t expect Silver Lake to be putting any more consideration on the table unless it thinks it won’t receive the vote at the shareholder meeting.

But if the players in the Dell buyout wanted to do a deal, a CVR might be a way to bridge the divide and accommodate the concerns of everyone.

Copyright ©2013 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved

 

This project was conducted as part of the Shareholder Forum's public interest  program for "Fair Investor Access," which is open free of charge to anyone concerned with investor interests in the development of marketplace standards for expanded access to information for securities valuation and shareholder voting decisions. As stated in the posted Conditions of Participation, the Forum's purpose is to provide decision-makers with access to information and a free exchange of views on the issues presented in the program's Forum Summary. Each participant is expected to make independent use of information obtained through the Forum, subject to the privacy rights of other participants.  It is a Forum rule that participants will not be identified or quoted without their explicit permission.

The management of Dell Inc. declined the Forum's invitation to provide leadership of this project, but was encouraged to collaborate in its progress to assure cost-efficient, timely delivery of information relevant to investor decisions. As the project evolved, those information requirements were ultimately satisfied in the context of an appraisal proceeding.

Inquiries about this project and requests to be included in its distribution list may be addressed to dell@shareholderforum.com.

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