Program Summary
(August 10, 2005)
In response to publicly expressed investor concerns about the
pricing of a merger transaction proposed by the management of
Providian Financial Corporation (“PVN”), a special “Forum”
program has been initiated for the limited purpose of arranging
an independent analysis of shareholder interests.
The program is intended to develop a broadly applicable process
for providing public shareholders with objective, professional
analyses of transaction proposals, as an alternative to the
current practice of relying on “fairness opinions” presented by
a transaction’s proponents.
Anyone with an interest in Providian or in the general objective
of assuring informed investment decisions is encouraged to
participate in the program, which will be managed by Gary Lutin
according to the usual Forum policies.
August 10, 2005
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PROXY Governance, Inc., a new subsidiary of
FOLIOfn offering
independent proxy advisory services to investors, published a report dated August 18, 2005 and
granted permission for its use in this
Forum program. The summary and conclusion sections are copied below, and the full
report can be downloaded from this link:
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PROXY Governance, INC. |
Contact: Alesandra Monaco
Published: 08/18/2005 |
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PROVIDIAN FINANCIAL CORP (NYSE : PVN) |
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Special Meeting |
▐Date:
08/31/200▐Record
Date: 08/01/2005 |
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[page 9]
Summary
We
note with some concern, the market’s reaction to the merger announcement as
Providian shares declined that week, the somewhat mixed analyst reactions to
the offer price, and Putnam’s opposition to the deal on the grounds that the
offer price is insufficient. We are also concerned that – based on the
background notes to the merger and the June 6 conference call – the level of
transparency with regard to management and the board’s decision-making
process is unacceptably low. While we recognize that such documentation does
not necessarily offer comprehensive insight into the decision-making and
negotiation process, its absence, especially when combined with the above
developments, does raise legitimate questions over the extent to which
Providian’s board in fact “did its homework” with regard to potential
opportunities and whether shareholders are being offered an appropriate
premium. Similarly, while Providian engaged two very well-known financial
advisors for the transaction, we note that these advisors collaborated in
performing each of their financial analyses, and we are always somewhat
uncomfortable when the “fairness” opinions are rendered by entities which
have a significant financial stake in the completion of the transaction.
On
balance, however, we believe that the offer price probably does represent a
minimally acceptable acquisition premium. We recognize that there has been
longstanding speculation over Providian as a potential takeover target and
that to some extent, an acquisition premium was already built into the
company’s stock price. We also note that since a significant portion of
Providian’s business stems from the sub-prime market, it would be
inappropriate to compare premiums with other credit card companies that have
stronger credit and customer portfolios; despite the strength of Providian’s
turnaround story, it remains a higher risk prospect. As such, we believe
that WaMu’s stronger credit quality will help to improve Providian’s funding
costs and enable the company to grow, given the broader marketing platform
and other resources. The move into the credit card industry, in turn, will
help WaMu to diversify its revenue and customer base. As noted above,
Providian shareholders will own approximately 13.5% of the combined company
and will have (should they choose to remain shareholders) a continuing stake
in its financial success. However, as indicated by Providian’s financial
advisors, we note that it is unclear the extent to which WaMu’s provisions
for the losses stemming from loan and lease portfolios and for impairment of
mortgage servicing rights and related risk management strategies are
sufficient. Based on various press reports, we believe that it is possible
that one reason for WaMu’s being perceived as a possible acquisition target
up until the proposed merger with Providian, was likely because, given the
rapidly consolidating industry trend, the markets perceived that WaMu did
not have sufficient market presence to play as competitive a role in its
existing businesses in the future as it has in the past. It is not clear
that WaMu with Providian will continue to be an attractive takeover target,
which could affect its share price in the longer term.
Rationale/Conclusion:
On
balance, PROXY
Governance
supports this merger proposal because we believe that Providian shareholders
will in the long run and in view of the competitive landscape, be better off
as shareholders of a financially stronger and more diversified company. The
complementary nature of the two companies’ businesses and customer bases –
and more importantly, WaMu’s stronger credit position – will provide
Providian with a stronger platform for competing in the U.S. credit card
industry. However, as previously discussed, we have some substantial
reservations with regard to the decision-making process, as well as
lingering questions which we feel have been inadequately addressed regarding
whether shareholders may have been able to receive a better deal.
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©
2005 by PROXY
Governance,
Inc.™ All Rights Reserved. The information contained in this proxy analysis
is confidential, for internal use only in accordance with the terms of the
subscriber’s subscription agreement, and may not be reproduced or
redistributed in any manner without prior written consent from PROXY
Governance,
Inc. All information is provided “as is” and without any warranty, is not
intended to solicit votes, and should not be relied on for investment or
other purposes. |
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