Forum Report
Inviting Comments on O’Byrne
Analysis of Pay Correlation
Following discussions stimulated by the
econometric studies of executive compensation he presented in a
recent program at the New York Society of Security Analysts (NYSSA), I
invited Stephen F. O’Byrne of
Shareholder Value Advisors, Inc., to provide Forum participants with a
summary of his observations. The following slides are intended to introduce
his analyses of how executive compensation actually relates to corporate and
marketplace conditions:
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April 7, 2009, Stephen F. O’Byrne:
“Six Factors That Explain Executive Pay” (17 pages, 195 KB, in
PDF format)
The professional rigor of Mr. O’Byrne’s
analysis is an important foundation for addressing compensation issues,
especially now that a broader range of decision-makers is becoming involved
in the determination of corporate practices. Consider, for example, the
support his quantitative analysis provides for these observations that many
of us have been discussing:
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Stock price is not the same thing as business performance.
Even advocates of efficient market theory recognize the lack of
correlation between the two over periods of less than a decade or more.
Offering “performance” incentives related to short-term market valuations
of a company’s stock is simply paying the executive to pump the stock
rather than to build a sustainable business.
-
It costs more to pay executives for risks they don’t control.
Anyone with common sense will want a promise of more money if he thinks
there’s a higher risk of payment. If someone is better at managing a
business operation than at managing stock prices, the promise of a payment
based on future stock price will be viewed as less controllable and
therefore higher risk.
Putting these observations together, you could
assume that the 1990s theory of “alignment” by paying executives with stock
options would result in significantly higher compensation than the previous
emphasis on relatively predictable cash payments. Mr. O’Byrne presents the
econometric evidence of that result in this graph (page 9):
Your comments will be welcomed, on Mr.
O’Byrne’s work as well as on the issues to be addressed.
GL – April 8, 2009
Gary Lutin
Lutin & Company
575 Madison Avenue, 10th Floor
New York, New York 10022
Tel: 212-605-0335
Email:
gl@shareholderforum.com
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