Anne Simpson, director of corporate governance
at the California Public Employees’ Pension Fund.
Activist investors like
Carl C. Icahn, Daniel S. Loeb and William A. Ackman are getting
deep-pocketed imitators.
Some of the biggest public
pension funds, which have sought to influence companies for years, are now
starting to emulate these investors by engaging with, and sometimes seeking
to oust, directors of companies whose stock they own.
Anne Simpson, director of
corporate governance at the California Public Employees’ Pension Fund, the
largest United States pension plan with $279 billion in assets, says “board
coups” this year that led to the departure of directors at
Hewlett-Packard,
JPMorgan Chase and
Occidental Petroleum show “how shareholder activism is evolving from
barbarians at the gate to acting like owners.”
Calpers is one of several big United States public funds that have
played roles in shareholder uprisings in recent years at companies that
included
Chesapeake Energy,
Nabors Industries and
Massey Energy. While some of the revolts were led by labor groups or
activist investors, Calpers has often cast its votes alongside them.
Ira M. Millstein, a lawyer
who specializes in corporate governance at Weil Gotshal & Manges, says it is
significant that “the biggest pension fund in the U.S. is taking an activist
role, going to companies that aren’t doing well and saying, ‘You really
ought to change.’ ”
The second-largest public
fund, the $176 billion California State Teachers Retirement System, went so
far as to co-sponsor a proposal with the activist fund Relational Investors
to break up the
Timken Company, the maker of steel and bearings, criticizing the outsize
representation of the founding Timken family, which held three of 11 board
seats while holding just 10 percent of the stock. Four months after the
proposal won a 53 percent vote, Timken acquiesced to a breakup in September.
Anne Sheehan, director of
corporate governance at Calstrs, says pension fund “activism and engagement
has stepped up quite a bit more as a result of the financial crisis when we
all lost a lot of value. As universal owners, how can we not assert our
rights and develop a relationship with companies in our portfolio?”
The big public funds have
successfully campaigned in the last decade for the right of shareholders to
elect each director individually by majority vote on an annual basis, more
recently using the procedure to seek the ouster of directors who receive a
heavy no vote. While the companies often are not legally bound to replace
directors who do not win a majority, some directors have resigned
voluntarily.
One of the last big
holdouts against majority voting was Apple, where Calpers waged a three-year
battle with steadily increasing shareholder votes, which culminated in
Apple’s agreement in 2012 to allow electing directors by majority vote.
The adoption of majority
voting “has made directors far more willing to engage,” said Ann Yerger,
executive director of the Council of Institutional Investors. Nell Minow,
the co-founder of the governance advisory firm GMI Ratings, says there has
been “a shift in tactics” among big activist investors “from shareholder
proposals to engagement and director replacement.”
This year may have marked a
“pivot point where the central focus of shareholder activism shifted” to
“direct challenges to board members,” according to a report in August by
Institutional Shareholders Services, which advises investors on proxy voting
and other governance issues.
At JPMorgan, for example,
Calpers and other investors backed a call by Change-to-Win, a labor group,
for the ouster of three directors on the board’s risk committee whose
qualifications were questioned after the bank suffered a $6.2 billion loss
on what became known as the London whale trades.
After receiving votes of
just 53 and 59 percent at the bank’s annual meeting in May, Ellen V. Futter,
president of the
American Museum of Natural History, and David M. Cote, the chairman and
chief executive of
Honeywell International, stepped down in July. The bank also designated
Lee R. Raymond, the former chief executive of
Exxon Mobil, to be the lead outside director after defeating an investor
campaign to separate the jobs of chief executive and chairman, both held by
Jamie Dimon.
Calpers also voted for a
boardroom shake-up at Hewlett-Packard, where two directors, G. Kennedy
Thompson, chairman of the audit committee, and John L. Hammergren, chairman
of the finance and investment committee, came under fire after the company
took $19 billion in write-downs on three expensive acquisitions.
At a meeting in Washington
in February, a month before HP’s annual meeting, the company’s chairman,
Raymond J. Lane, and another director faced a group of about 15
institutional investors including Calstrs and the $144 billion New York City
pension funds. While the directors “tried to defend the board processes” in
reviewing the acquisitions, “it was too little, too late,” said Michael
Garland, head of corporate governance for the New York City comptroller,
John C. Liu. After votes of just 59 percent for Mr. Lane, 55 percent for
Mr. Thompson and 54 percent for Mr. Hammergren, Mr. Lane stepped down as
chairman and the two others also left.
Calpers has also backed
director reshuffles or resignations over executive pay at Occidental and
Chesapeake and over safety at Massey. Ms. Simpson says stocks of companies
subject to such actions have beaten the market — some critics dispute that —
and Calpers plans to increase the assets it has devoted to those causes. In
recent years, she says, “what once upon a time had been viewed as sniping
has become viewed as responsible ownership.”
Sometimes companies work
harmoniously with investors. At the
UnitedHealth Group, where Calpers had the right to appoint one director
unilaterally under the terms of the settlement of a past lawsuit, Ms.
Simpson worked with the chairwoman of the nominating and corporate
governance committee, Michele J. Hooper, in 2012 to find a mutually
acceptable nominee, Rodger A. Lawson, a former president of Fidelity
Investments.
Many companies are also
deploying board members to gain the support of big investors in case they
are confronted by activist hedge funds seeking management or strategy
changes or fielding their own director candidates through proxy votes. “We
advise our clients that it makes a great deal of sense for directors to meet
with the major shareholders,” said Martin Lipton, who represents corporate
boards at Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz.
But other companies resist
shareholder pressure. At Nabors Industries, an energy services company,
where investors have complained about oversize executive severance pay, two
directors, John Yearwood and John V. Lombardi, received votes of just 47
percent and 44 percent last June. But the Nabors board rejected resignations
by the two directors, which they had tendered pursuant to company bylaws,
and they continue to serve.
Ms. Simpson, who joined
Calpers in 2009, cut her teeth in governance at the
World Bank. There she worked on a task force led by Mr. Millstein that
barnstormed emerging markets in the late 1990s to help local officials
understand what governance protections global investors sought. She and Mr.
Millstein have since taught corporate governance together at Yale.
Calpers, which once
published an annual list of companies it said had poor corporate governance,
has halted its so-called name and shame program in favor of a
behind-the-scenes approach, which Ms. Simpson calls “speak softly and carry
a big stick.” The stick, she adds, “needs to be used sparingly.” She added,
“The issue needs to be fundamental, or when you have a demonstrable failure
of oversight.”
Because Calpers indexes
much of its stock market investments, it owns 0.5 percent or more of most
public companies. As long-term investors who plan to hold on to the stock,
Mr. Millstein says, Calpers can credibly tell companies “we’re willing to
work with you.”
Calpers sets its own
priorities and doesn’t slavishly follow activist investors or proxy advisory
services, Ms. Simpson notes. She said she urged a separation of the chairman
and chief executive jobs at JPMorgan in her first meeting with Mr. Dimon in
2010, before the trading blowup.
What is more, she adds, the
fund’s efforts depend on gaining widespread support among other mainstream
investors. She often works with other big funds to reach common goals, like
soliciting votes for governance proposals by the New York City funds at
Chesapeake and Nabors.
Gianna McCarthy, director
of corporate governance at the $161 billion New York State Common Retirement
Fund, adds, “I think there is more of an ability for public funds to
register their dissatisfaction with directors and eventually have them
resign from boards.”
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