Activists and Socially Responsible
Investing
Posted by Charles Nathan, Finsbury LLC, on
Wednesday, January 31, 2018
At first blush, activists embracing socially
responsible investing sounds like an oxymoron. After all, a common perception is
that activist investors are solely financial engineers who seek short-term stock
market gains by leveraging balance sheets, selling off valuable corporate assets
and imprudent cost-cutting of R&D and other long-term value creators. What could
be farther from short-term financial engineering than socially responsible
investing, which typically looks to a much longer-term impact on the company’s
financial and commercial performance?
However, like so much in life, the real
world is far more complicated and harder to categorize. First, many
activist campaigns are not about financial engineering in any sense.
While activists sometimes do campaign on platforms that include (or
perhaps consist principally of) cost-cutting, far from all of these
are imprudent cost reductions at the expense of long-term growth. More
important, many activist campaigns focus on building the business
through better organizational structures and/or more effective focus
on improving the quality of goods and services. Indeed, the latter
type of activist investor policy has been in the ascendant among
leading activist investors for several years now.
But even so, a focus on organizational, operational
and product improvement seems a far cry from socially responsible investing. So
it attracted some notice when Trian Partners modified its web site last year to
add a statement embracing ESG and a compendium of ESG highlights at its current
portfolio companies. For example:
“Trian believes that ESG issues can have
an impact on a company’s culture and long-term performance and that
companies can implement appropriate ESG initiatives that increase
their sales and earnings.”
“We also believe that the consideration
of ESG factors enhances our overall investment process.” |
Trian’s ESG investment policy does seem
significantly different from the ESG investment policies of many leading
institutional investors, particularly the largest index investors (e.g.,
BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street). Indeed, the examples of its ESG investing
which Trian provides on its website could as easily have been posted by a
conventional institutional investor highlighting its ESG initiatives, such as
promoting diversity in the workforce, director independence, board refreshment,
emission and waste reduction and adoption of supplier codes of conduct.
The similarity of Trian’s ESG policy to that of
other major institutional investors suggests it has two complementary purposes.
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First, an increasing number of institutional
investors believe that a company’s economic performance and stock market
valuation is frequently dependent on specific ESG issues inherent in its
business model and are thus integral to any investment decision involving the
company. It is natural for Trian as a value investor to subscribe to this
investing policy.
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Second, the success of Trian’s activist business
model depends on support for its company specific campaigns from traditional
long institutional investors. In this view, Trian’s very public embrace of ESG
investing can be viewed as courting, in particular, the three major index
investors (all of whom are staunch supporters of ESG investing), as well as
state and local pension funds, union pension funds and other core corporate
governance activists who almost universally champion ESG investing.
More recently and far more dramatically than Trian’s
embrace of ESG investing, Jana Partners published a joint letter with CalSTRS
calling on Apple to recognize the potential dangers to children and teenagers of
too frequent use and abuse of their iPhones and to implement a far-reaching
program of research on the effects of excessive social media use by youngsters
as well as far more sophisticated and effective programming choices on iPhones
to enable parents to limit the devices’ usage by their children.
In addition, Jana announced that it was planning to
raise a new fund, called Jana Impact Capital. According to a press report, the
new Jana fund is targeted at $1.7 billion and would invest in companies that
“are good bets but could do better for the world. The fund’s board of advisers
includes Sting and others who have a track record of pressuring companies on
environmental, social and governance issues.”
The Jana and CalSTRS campaign at Apple, and
presumably the investment thesis of its proposed Impact Fund, are clearly of a
different order from Trian’s approach to ESG investing. Jana is not merely
taking ESG into account in its investment analysis, it is going a significant
step further by using one or several ESG issues as the fulcrum of its activist
campaign. The obvious questions are what is Jana hoping to accomplish and what
are the possible impediments to its goals?
An obvious answer would be to foster positive ESG
change at a target company thereby enhancing the value of Jana’s equity
position. There are, however, at least two underlying problems with this
explanation.
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Will the ESG issue championed by Jana resonate
sufficiently with other investors to motivate the target company to adopt the
proposed policy change without requiring more aggressive moves by Jana? The
answer is more complicated than it might initially seem. It is probably yes,
if there is broad institutional investor support and the change doesn’t
materially alter the company’s business model. But if that’s the case, how
likely is the change to produce a sufficient up-tick in the company’s stock
price to justify the activist campaign?
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On the other hand, if the company rejects the
proposed ESG change, will it matter enough to enough shareholders to give
credence to further more aggressive agitation by the activist? Historically,
ESG issues have not been viewed as sufficiently connected to value to create
this sort of leverage for its proponents. Will Jana be able to identify ESG
issues that have so much appeal to institutional shareholders that the ESG
issues can serve as the fulcrum for a threatened or actual proxy contest?
There is, however, another, somewhat cynical,
explanation of Jana’s ESG strategy. As one commentator
speculated:
“The [Apple campaign] will almost
certainly help Rosenstein [the head of Jana] as he seeks capital
allocations from public pension funds for his traditional activist
fund and its more aggressive, less friendly agitations….Also, it could
help Jana Partners gain support for its campaigns in the form of votes
of big institutional investors…The [Apple] campaign fits squarely
within the category of…ESG, an investing category that sizeable public
pension funds such as CalSTRS as well as the primary index funds,
including Vanguard Group, State Street, and BlackRock, are
concentrating on heavily.” |
This speculation about Jana’s motives also notes
that the Jana’s new fund will not charge investors the traditional hedge fund “2
and 20”—that is a fee equal to 2% of the investment plus 20% of the profits.
Rather, according to press reports its fee structure will be just 2% of invested
fund with no success fee. The supposition is that the proposed fee structure
illustrates that Jana is not counting on its ESG activism to achieve profits of
the same order as its more traditional activist investing. Rather, Jana’s
principal purpose is to create a “halo” effect that will advance Jana’s
traditional activist investing model in terms of support for its activist
campaigns by and its asset gathering from the larger index investors and state,
local and union pension funds.
The more cynical explanation of Jana’s strategy has
its flaws, as well. It ignores that Jana’s business model, both as an asset
gatherer and as an activist investor, is wholly dependent on its ability to
provide outsize returns for its investors. Creating an ESG fund that doesn’t and
isn’t intended do this may adversely affect its conventional asset gathering.
Moreover, Jana’s credibility and success as an activist investor is clearly
based in large part on its history as a successful and to be feared opponent. A
history of issuer friendly ESG investing (as it seemingly is positioning its
Apple foray) and/or of failed activist ESG campaigns will not burnish its record
as a conventional “to be feared” activist investor.
If Jana’s strategy and the success of that strategy
are murky, so is the play book for its corporate targets. Right now, the
strategy is too new and uncertain to make useful predictions, let alone develop
prototype company response playbooks. At least initially, a company that is
targeted by an activist ESG campaign will have to evaluate its situation against
a relatively blank slate in terms of prior experience. Moreover, its response
will have to be tailored to the precise ESG issue it is facing and the economic
consequences of its acceding to or contesting the proposal. For Apple to embrace
the Jana/CalSTRS proposals would not be the same as Exxon agreeing to an ESG
based proposal to cease its ocean-based oil drilling and production. The only
sensible advice for companies worrying about the implications of Jana’s attempt
to create an ESG based version of activist investing is simply to “stay tuned to
the program.”
Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
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