Forum
distribution:
Leading management defense adviser fully adopts traditional views
of director duties
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For other recent statements of the author's progressing
repudiation of the corporate management defense playbook he had
pioneered and advocated since the 1980s, see
Views now advocated by Mr. Lipton were summarized in a
tribute to a previous era's board leader of competitively successful and
widely respected companies, in the
Fall 1997 Directors & Boards, "A Timeless Model: J. Keith
Louden," with the concluding observation that “the fundamentals of
fiduciary duty have not changed, and that they never will." |
Source:
The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation, June 28, 2019 posting |
Spotlight on Boards
Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, on Friday, June 28, 2019
Editor’s Note:
Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen
& Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters
affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a
Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton and is part of
the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are
available
here. |
The ever-evolving challenges facing
corporate boards prompt periodic updates to a snapshot of what is
expected from the board of directors of a major public company—not
just the legal rules, or the principles published by institutional
investors and various corporate and investor associations, but also
the aspirational “best practices” that have come to have equivalent
influence on board and company behavior. A very significant June
decision by the Delaware Supreme Court interpreting the
Caremark doctrine that limits director liability for an
oversight failure to “utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists” prompts this update. Our memo
discussing the decision is available here.
The Court said to “satisfy their duty of loyalty,” “directors must
make a good faith effort to implement an oversight system and then
monitor it” themselves. Without more, the existence of
management-level compliance programs is not enough for the directors
to avoid Caremark exposure.
Today, boards are expected to:
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Recognize the heightened focus of investors on
“purpose” and “culture” and an expanded notion of stakeholder interests that
includes employees, customers, communities, the economy and society as a whole
and work with management to develop metrics to enable the corporation to
demonstrate their value;
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Be aware that ESG and sustainability have become
major, mainstream governance topics that encompass a wide range of issues,
such as climate change and other environmental risks, systemic financial
stability, worker wages, training, retraining, healthcare and retirement,
supply chain labor standards and consumer and product safety;
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Oversee corporate strategy (including purpose and
culture) and the communication of that strategy to investors, keeping in mind
that investors want to be assured not just about current risks and problems,
but threats to long-term strategy from global, political, social, and
technological developments;
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Work with management to review the corporation’s
strategy, and related disclosures, in light of the annual letters to CEOs and
directors, or other communications, from BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard,
and other investors, describing the investors’ expectations with respect to
corporate strategy and how it is communicated;
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Set the “tone at the top” to create a corporate
culture that gives priority to ethical standards, professionalism, integrity
and compliance in setting and implementing both operating and strategic goals;
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Oversee and understand the corporation’s risk
management, and compliance plans and efforts and how risk is taken into
account in the corporation’s business decision-making; monitor risk
management; respond to red flags if and when they arise;
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Choose the CEO, monitor the CEO’s and management’s
performance and develop and keep current a succession plan;
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Have a lead independent director or a
non-executive chair of the board who can facilitate the functioning of the
board and assist management in engaging with investors;
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Together with the lead independent director or the
non-executive chair, determine the agendas for board and committee meetings
and work with management to ensure that appropriate information and sufficient
time are available for full consideration of all matters;
-
Determine the appropriate level of executive
compensation and incentive structures, with awareness of the potential impact
of compensation structures on business priorities and risk-taking, as well as
investor and proxy advisor views on compensation;
-
Develop a working partnership with the CEO and
management and serve as a resource for management in charting the appropriate
course for the corporation;
-
Monitor and participate, as appropriate, in
shareholder engagement efforts, evaluate corporate governance proposals, and
work with management to anticipate possible takeover attempts and activist
attacks in order to be able to address them more effectively, if they should
occur;
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Meet at least annually with the team of company
executives and outside advisors that will advise the corporation in the event
of a takeover proposal or an activist attack;
-
Be open to management inviting an activist to meet
with the board to present the activist’s opinion of the strategy and
management of the corporation;
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Evaluate the individual director’s, board’s and
committees’ performance on a regular basis and consider the optimal board and
committee composition and structure, including board refreshment, expertise
and skill sets, independence and diversity, as well as the best way to
communicate with investors regarding these issues;
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Review corporate governance guidelines and
committee workloads and charters and tailor them to promote effective board
and committee functioning;
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Be prepared to deal with crises; and
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Be prepared to take an active role in matters
where the CEO may have a real or perceived conflict, including takeovers and
attacks by activist hedge funds focused on the CEO.
To meet these expectations, major public companies
should seek to:
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Have a sufficient number of directors to staff the
requisite standing and special committees and to meet investor expectations
for experience, expertise, diversity, and periodic refreshment;
-
Compensate directors commensurate with the time
and effort that they are required to devote and the responsibility that
they assume;
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Have directors who have knowledge of, and
experience with, the corporation’s businesses and with the geopolitical
developments that affect it, even if this results in the board having more
than one director who is not “independent”;
-
Have directors who are able to devote sufficient
time to preparing for and attending board and committee meetings and engaging
with investors;
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Provide the directors with the data that is
critical to making sound decisions on strategy, compensation and
capital allocation;
-
Provide the directors with regular tutorials by
internal and external experts as part of expanded director education and to
assure that in complicated, multi-industry and new-technology corporations,
the directors have the information and expertise they need to respond to
disruption, evaluate current strategy and strategize beyond the horizon; and
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Maintain a truly collegial relationship among and
between the company’s senior executives and the members of the board that
facilitates frank and vigorous discussion and enhances the board’s role as
strategic partner, evaluator, and monitor.
Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
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