Forum Report
Alternatives Defined at May 14 Meeting
Yesterday’s open meeting of the Shareholder Forum, hosted by the
New York Society of Security Analysts (“NYSSA”), addressed several
issues that may be considered by investors in Bear Stearns as well as in its
prospective acquirer, JPMorgan Chase. As summarized below, these issues
may be relevant to both buy-sell and voting decisions.
We expect to follow up tomorrow or Monday with these reports, focused on the
information requirements for shareholder voting before May 29:
►
Glass Lewis
is expected to release its report by tomorrow on client voting
recommendations for the proposed Bear Stearns acquisition by JPMorgan, and
we will present it to Forum participants as soon as it’s available.
►
As soon as we get Forum participant feedback to refine the
idea of an optional “Value Realization” stock discussed at the meeting – or
replace it with a better idea – the Forum will present the suggested
alternative for JPMorgan’s consideration and comment.
The following summary of the meeting is necessarily brief, and you are of
course encouraged to ask for more information about anything that interests
you.
Litigation
The first subject on the meeting’s agenda was a discussion with Daniel W.
Krasner, of the law firm
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, about his firm’s shareholder
litigation claims that the proposed JPMorgan acquisition of Bear Stearns was
not properly negotiated and that Bear Stearns shareholders should therefore
be compensated based on a court-established value instead of what was
negotiated.
Generally, Mr. Krasner explained that it is not practical to try to block
the proposed transaction, and most meeting participants agreed that there
was and is no practical alternative to a JPMorgan acquisition. The
objective of the litigation, under these circumstances, is simply to get a
higher payment to Bear Stearns shareholders.
Mr. Krasner explained that any shareholder benefit from the case will depend
on the court’s finding that either (a) the sale to JPMorgan of 39.5% of Bear
Stearns stock without shareholder approval was improper or (b) that JPMorgan
is a controlling shareholder that must act in the interests of Bear Stearns’
minority shareholders. If the court finds that one of these or any other
claim provides a basis for awarding something to shareholders, the amount
would depend on a valuation which is usually determined by courts based on
presentations of professional “experts” hired by both sides.
In a discussion of what would be relevant to these findings, Mr. Krasner as
well as other meeting participants familiar with how judges make decisions
observed that a court could be expected to seriously consider the views
expressed by Forum participants and other investors, particularly as
reflected in the shareholder voting on May 29 for the currently proposed
JPMorgan acquisition. A high level of minority shareholder opposition to
the proposed transaction would show a judge that the investors think they
are being treated unfairly, while a high level of support would show him
that investors don’t really see a need to fix anything.
If the litigation progresses to issues of valuation, it was observed that a
court might also welcome the views of genuine investors on that subject.
Meeting participants familiar with the process concurred that at least some
judges might welcome credible valuation information from sources other than
the ritualized presentations of hired witnesses.
Proposed exchange option
The next subject addressed at the meeting was the development of a suggested
alternative that could be presented to JPMorgan for its consideration, on
the assumption that a sensibly designed variation of the transaction
negotiated in the mid-March panic might be better for all parties, including
the shareholders of JPMorgan.
As a foundation for discussion, the appended draft
summary sheet and
analysis of an optional “Value Realization” stock was distributed to meeting
participants for their review. The draft was introduced with an
acknowledged need to simplify either this or any alternative concept, or at
least its presentation, and with an invitation to (a) request analysis of
different assumptions and (b) suggest improvements of either the terms or
presentation. All Forum participants are invited to do the same within the
next couple of days, as indicated above.
During the meeting it was emphasized that, to be practical, the terms of any
alternative to the currently proposed transaction must result in value
enhancement of JPMorgan stock. It was observed that the direct cost impact
per share of JPMorgan stock was not likely to be meaningful even with
extreme assumptions of the amount of value allocated, considering that the
maximum number of JPMorgan shares that might be issued for the Bear Stearns
acquisition would be less than 1% of the shares outstanding. It was
suggested that the most significant impact on value would be from the “brand
image” result of JPMorgan’s management of the transaction, based on
generally expressed views and supported by the responses of JPMorgan
investors in last week’s survey of NYSSA members.
Shareholder voting
Shareholder voting decisions were addressed again, noting that the earlier
observations of how a court would view the results might apply also to
JPMorgan in its consideration leadership responsibilities.
It was emphasized that voting could not result in a rejection of the
proposed acquisition, since JPMorgan controls 51% of the vote either
directly or through support agreements, so that shareholders would not have
to be concerned about “killing the deal.” Voting could be viewed as a safe
expression of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the terms presented to
Bear Stearns shareholders, with the expectation that the results will be
considered by the court, by JPMorgan, and by the marketplace.
Robert M. McCormick, the Chief Policy Officer of Glass Lewis, indicated that
he and his colleagues would be considering the views expressed during the
meeting in their determination of client voting recommendations. As
indicated above, he expects to issue the report by the end of this week.
Valuation questions
During all parts of the meeting, discussion turned repeatedly to the
challenges of valuing either the stock or the component assets of Bear
Stearns. Questions ranged from the date that should be used for setting a
price to the complications of determining whose securities are sold from an
integrated trading desk. It was noted during the meeting that recent
reports had also created confusion between valuation and purchase accounting
provisions.
Based on the issues raised during the meeting as well as in other
communications with Forum participants, the valuation issues will require
further attention as specific applications are defined.
GL – May 15, 2008
Gary Lutin
Lutin & Company
575 Madison Avenue, 10th Floor
New York, New York 10022
Tel: 212-605-0335
Email:
gl@shareholderforum.com
Shareholder Forum for The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc.
Optional BSC Value Realization Shares
|
Exchange Option |
JPMorgan Chase (“JPM”) will offer holders of Bear Stearns (“BSC”)
the option to exchange each share of BSC common stock for either
0.21753 shares of JPM common stock, as currently proposed, or,
alternatively, for one (1) share of a special class of JPM stock
designated “BSC Value Realization Stock” (“BVR” shares). |
Distribution Rights |
A portion of the value ultimately realized by JPM from the
acquired BSC assets (including business operations) will be
distributed annually to holders of BVR shares. |
Conversion Rights |
BVR shares may be converted at any time into JPM shares, with the
number of JPM shares equal to [Variable “C”]% of the 0.21753 JPM
shares originally offered for each BSC share. |
Value Realization |
Value Realization will be determined based on
(a)
amounts realized from sales to independent parties,
(b)
independent valuations of assets or operations integrated
into JPM business, and
(c)
market value of assets held for sale after 5 years. |
Allocation of Value |
[Variable “A”]% of the Value Realization will be allocated and
then divided by the number of BSC shares that had been eligible
for BVR shares. |
Threshold for Distributions |
Allocations of Value Realization in excess of a $[Variable “T”]
per BVR share threshold amount will be distributed. |
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May 14, 2008
Workshop Report - Analysis |
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Case: |
A |
B |
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Assumptions |
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Number of BSC shares
eligible for offer |
145,739,293
|
145,739,293
|
Portion of BSC
shares exchanged for BVR stock |
25.0% |
25.0% |
Number of JPM shares
outstanding, before offer |
3,396,539,059
|
3,396,539,059
|
Number of JPM shares
offered for BSC shares |
0.21753 |
0.21753 |
Value Realization
from BSC assets |
$10,300,000,000
|
$2,000,000,000
|
Market value of JPM
share |
$45.00 |
$45.00 |
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Proposal
Variables: |
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A |
Allocation of Value
Realization to eligible BSC shares |
80.0% |
80.0% |
T |
Threshold for
distributions, per BVR share |
$10.00 |
$10.00 |
C |
Conversion Rate
(percent of 0.21753 primary exchange) |
50.0% |
50.0% |
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Analysis |
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Number of BVR shares
issued |
36,434,823
|
36,434,823
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Amount of Value
Realization allocated to BVR shares |
$1,695,651,768
|
$35,651,768
|
|
Percent of total
Value Realization |
16.5% |
1.8% |
Distribution per BVR
share |
$46.54 |
$0.98 |
Conversion value of
BVR share |
$4.89 |
$4.89 |
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Number of JPM shares
outstanding, after offer |
3,420,316,060
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3,420,316,060
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JPM shares reserved
for BVR conversions |
3,962,834
|
3,962,834
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Percent outstanding
JPM shares |
0.1159% |
0.1159% |
Cost of BVR
distribution per JPM share |
$0.4958 |
$0.0104 |
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