ISS May Be Under Fire, but Look How Far It —
and Shareholder Rights — Have Come
As proxy season heats up — of particular
interest will be a whole new category of “say on pay” shareholder proposals
— proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS) is under unprecedented scrutiny. That includes possible — and, in my
view,
unnecessary — new
regulatory requirements from the SEC.
ISS is often described as “influential,”
and public companies frequently complain that too many institutional
investors vote their shares according to ISS recommendation without any
independent evaluation. They also complain about conflicts of interest
because ISS does consulting work for some of the companies it evaluates. The
industry-sponsored Center on Executive Compensation sent a
letter to institutional investors urging them to
grill ISS about its conflicts. Oddly enough, the center was silent about
its own conflicts.
I was the fourth person hired at ISS, back
in 1986, and was its general counsel and briefly its CEO before leaving to
join its founder, Bob Monks,
in the second of our three business ventures. I well remember Bob explaining
to me his original vision for the role of institutional investors in
corporate governance.
Investors got smart… and organized
I had never heard either of those terms
before, and it all seemed very idealistic and far-fetched. But we were there
at the moment of collision between the takeover-era corporate raiders and
entrenched managers on the one hand and increasingly enlightened and
activist investors on the other. These investors were smart enough to know
when they had been mistreated, obligated as fiduciaries to respond, and big
enough to make that response matter.
In those days, shareholder initiatives
could seldom garner enough votes to make them eligible for resubmission the
following year. Now
shareholders are voting down excessive pay plans and
vetting director candidates.
ISS has been a part of that, growing from
our four-person, one client operation in 1986 to a world-wide enterprise
advising institutional investors on proxy and other governance issues, at
one time a public company itself as a part of RiskMetrics and now a
subsidiary of MSCI. And,
with its rival Glass Lewis,
proxy advisory services have become so influential that advisors will
claim victory about a 70 percent majority for a compensation plan, one
that what a few years ago would have resulted in a routine vote high in the
90s.
What ISS critics get wrong
The corporate critics of ISS have largely
failed to make a credible or coherent argument. They complain that ISS is
too influential, even though their own numbers show that
it sways no more than 20 percent of the vote. Other data suggest that
the more controversial the issue, the more ISS clients review their analysis
and come to their own conclusions.
Of course, companies don’t mind ISS’s
influence when — as in the vast majority of cases — the firm recommends a
vote in favor of management.
ISS is often accused of being too rigid and
formulaic. There is some justification for this; it relies on formulas to
demonstrate that it is not swayed by conflicts from its consulting fees. But
ISS is
also criticized for departing from its formula. This is absurd; no
formula should take precedence over concerns about performance.
What ISS critics get right
In my opinion, though, ISS really shouldn’t
do consulting work for companies it covers. I didn’t allow it when I was CEO
of ISS, and I didn’t allow it at The Corporate Library. I
often disagree with the analysis and recommendations of ISS (they
recommended against me a couple of times, for example). But I’m comfortable
letting its customers make that call. I remember how long we waited for our
second client — the first was an old friend of Bob’s who took pity on us —
and I’m proud of how far they’ve come.
ISS has
produced a 25th anniversary book (free to
download, but
registration required) with essays by 25 of the very best, brightest, and
most insightful in the world of corporate governance. Highlights include:
- Bob Monks, Ralph Whitworth
of Relational Investors,
and Hye-Won Choi of
TIAA-CREF
on the investor side;
- Peggy Foran of
Prudential,
Martin Lipton of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz, and Ken Bertsch
of the
Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals
on the corporate executive side;
- Charles Elson of the
University of Delaware’s
Weinberg Center
for Corporate Governance and Ira Millstein
and Holly Gregory of
Weil, Gotshal, and Manges on boards of directors;
- And an international perspective from
Knut Kjaer of the Dutch fund
ABP,
the largest pension fund in Europe and Andre Baladi,
co-founder of the International
Corporate Governance Network, the world’s leading association
of institutional investors.
The contributors
all have points of disagreement with each other, but all agree that we’ve
experienced enormous changes in the world of corporate governance over the
past quarter-century. And just about everyone recognizes that executive
compensation will be an increasingly important focus for investors. The
book is an indispensable resource for anyone who wants to understand the
corporate governance now and where it is going.
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