The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting
Recommendations
This report examines current
evidence regarding the influence of third-party proxy advisory firms’
voting recommendations on shareholder proposal voting outcomes,
particularly say-on-pay votes. It also presents the findings of a study,
conducted by The Conference Board, NASDAQ, and the Rock Center for
Corporate Governance at Stanford University, which shows that proxy
advisory firms have a substantial impact on the design of executive
compensation programs. However, the impact of those firms on governance
quality and shareholder value is still unknown.
A growing body of evidence
demonstrates the influential role that third-party proxy advisory firms
play in affecting the voting outcome of proposals made to shareholders in
the annual proxy, particularly say-on-pay votes, which became mandatory
for most public companies in 2011. There is less evidence, however, to
establish the extent to which companies respond to this influence by
changing the size and structure of executive compensation plans to conform
to proxy advisor voting polices. A recent study conducted by The
Conference Board, NASDAQ, and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at
Stanford University found that proxy advisory firms have a substantial
impact on the design of executive compensation programs.
Say on Pay and Proxy
Advisory Firms
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) requires that public
companies allow shareholders the opportunity to cast an advisory vote on
executive compensation—a process known as say on pay (SOP). Depending on
how that voting information is used by the board of directors, SOP can
have an important influence on a company’s compensation policies. While a
shareholder vote against the executive compensation program does not
obligate a company to make changes, rejection of a plan or low levels of
shareholder approval can bring increased scrutiny of the program and
governance practices overall by institutional shareholders, the media,
proxy advisory firms, and corporate governance activists. In addition,
several companies that failed SOP votes have had shareholder derivative
lawsuits filed against them, including Cincinnati Bell, KeyCorp, and
Occidental Petroleum. For these reasons, companies and boards of directors
care greatly about the outcome of SOP votes.
Also important is the role
that proxy advisory firms play in assisting institutional investors in
their determination of shareholder votes. Institutional shareholders have
a fiduciary duty to vote their shares on all proxy items, including SOP,
and are required to disclose their voting policies and their actual votes
to the public. To ensure that their voting policies and process are not in
conflict, many institutional investors subscribe to third-party proxy
advisory firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass
Lewis to receive research, analysis, and vote recommendations on proxy
proposals—and in many cases, to determine whether they should vote for or
against a proposal. These voting recommendations are developed based on a
set of criteria considered by proxy advisory firms to be desirable
structural features for elements of corporate governance or executive
compensation.
Institutional Shareholder
Services examines the following attributes in formulating its
recommendation on SOP:
- CEO pay and performance;
- problematic pay practices;
- communication and
responsiveness to shareholders;
- the performance metrics
used in incentive plans;
- the use of peer groups in
benchmarking executive pay; and
- the balance of performance
and non-performance-based pay.
Institutional Shareholder
Services also offers consulting services through which companies can
receive feedback and guidance on ways to improve their executive
compensation program and increase the likelihood of a favorable SOP
recommendation. Access to ISS’s recommendations is made available on a
subscription basis, so firms and their advisors as well as academics can
research recommendations made for other firms.
Glass Lewis generally
provides less public detail of the implementation of its policies.
However, they use criteria similar to ISS in forming their
recommendations:
- the overall design and
structure of the company’s executive compensation program, including
performance metrics;
- the quality and content of
the company’s disclosure;
- the amount paid to
executives; and
- the link between
compensation and performance as indicated by the company’s current and
past pay-for-performance grades.
It should be noted that Glass
Lewis does not offer consulting services to companies and does not
generally provide access to their recommendations to corporate issuers or
to the academic community.
Among the survey respondents,
ISS and Glass Lewis made the same recommendation 75.0 percent of the time.
However, ISS was generally more likely to recommend voting against
management’s SOP proposal, doing so in 19.2 percent of cases, while Glass
Lewis recommended a vote against management in approximately 16.5 percent
of cases. These figures are consistent with the overall proxy season
statistics of 17.5 percent and 12.5 percent respectively, recommended by
Glass Lewis and ISS in 2011.
Evidence suggests that
institutional investors respond to the voting recommendations of proxy
advisory firms. For example, a negative recommendation from ISS, the
largest proxy advisory firm, has been shown on average to influence
between 13.6 percent and 20.6 percent of votes cast on management-
sponsored proposals. During the 2011 proxy season, no company that
received a positive recommendation from ISS failed its SOP vote, and 12.0
percent of companies that received a negative recommendation from ISS
failed their SOP vote.
The evidence is considerably
less established, however, about whether companies themselves respond to
the policies and voting recommendations of proxy advisory firms as they
relate to SOP. Companies might be more likely to change their executive
compensation plans if they believe that a major proxy advisory firm is
poised to issue a negative recommendation, given the influence that these
recommendations have on voting outcomes. Furthermore, ISS provides extra
scrutiny to companies that receive less than 75 percent support for SOP,
and Glass Lewis provides extra scrutiny for companies that receive less
than 80 percent support for SOP.
Companies might make changes
to their compensation plans to secure the positive recommendation of these
firms with the hope of keeping support above these thresholds. For
example, following criticism from ISS in 2011, The Walt Disney Company
removed tax gross-up provisions from the employment agreement of four
senior executives, and General Electric voluntarily changed the structure
of the equity incentive program offered to CEO Jeffrey Immelt. As a result
of the changes, ISS reversed its negative voting recommendation on both
companies’ SOP proposals.
In 2012, Shuffle Master
specifically referenced ISS’s negative vote recommendation during the
previous year as the reason for its decision to amend the
change-of-control provision in the employment agreement of Chief Operating
Officer David Lopez.
The Conference Board, NASDAQ,
and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University survey
found that proxy advisory firms had a very direct influence on the
compensation structures employed by companies, and that the policies and
recommendations of these firms compelled many companies to make changes to
their executive compensation programs that they would not have otherwise
made.
During the 2011 proxy season,
72.0 percent of companies reviewed the policies of a proxy advisory firm
or engaged with a proxy advisory firm to receive feedback and guidance on
their proposed executive compensation plan.
A large majority of companies
(70.4 percent) reported that their compensation programs were influenced
by the guidance received from proxy advisory firms or by the policies of
these firms.
Companies reported making a
broad range of changes to their compensation program in response to proxy
advisory firm policies. Roughly a third (31.7 percent) enhanced disclosure
in the annual proxy, and 23.8 percent reduced or eliminated certain
severance benefits. In addition, 15.8 percent reduced other benefits and
perquisites, 12.9 percent adopted stock ownership guidelines or retention
guidelines, and 8.9 percent introduced performance-based equity awards.
Approximately half of
companies (51.2 percent) anticipate making changes to their executive
compensation program for the 2012 proxy season. Companies are most likely
to make changes to their disclosure policies and practices, to introduce
performance-based equity awards, and to change to the peer group used for
benchmarking purposes.
Companies that received low
support for their SOP proposal in 2011 are more likely to make changes in
2012, whereas those who received high support are significantly less
likely to plan to make changes.
These companies are much more
likely to engage the consulting division of a proxy advisory firm to
receive feedback and guidance on their proposed executive compensation
plan. They are also much more likely to reduce overall pay levels,
introduce performance-based equity awards, make changes to the target
level of their pay relative to their peer group, and enhance disclosure.
Conclusion
The survey results clearly
show that companies do respond to the SOP policies adopted by proxy
advisory firms. The majority of companies determine in advance whether
their executive compensation programs are likely to receive a favorable
recommendation from ISS or Glass Lewis; and companies are likely to make
changes to a program in anticipation of a negative recommendation from
these firms. All areas of the compensation program are affected, including
disclosure, guidelines, and plan structure and design—although the degree
to which these areas are affected varies considerably.
While the evidence suggests
that companies are aware of and react to proxy advisory policies as they
relate to SOP, the evidence does not speak to whether these changes are
positive or negative for shareholders. Until proxy advisory firm
methodologies are vetted by third-party examiners, it cannot be determined
whether these changes are beneficial to companies and their shareholders.
However, proxy advisory firms are an important influence on compensation
plan design.
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