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He likes to chat. Photographer: Peter Foley/Bloomberg |
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Matt Levine is a Bloomberg View
columnist writing about Wall Street and the financial world.
Levine was previously an editor of Dealbreaker. He has worked as
an investment banker at Goldman Sachs and a mergers and
acquisitions lawyer at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. He spent
a year clerking for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit and taught high school Latin. Levine has a bachelor's
degree in classics from Harvard University and a law degree from
Yale Law School. He lives in New York. |
Wall Street
Sometimes Companies Meet With Their Owners
Sept 28, 2015 6:06 PM EDT
By
Matt Levine
An
important idea in modern corporate capitalism is that the shareholders
are the owners of the corporation. If you believe this -- and most
people mostly do, though you shouldn't take it too literally[1]
-- then you presumably also think that the managers work for the
owners, that is, for the shareholders. The least the managers can do,
then, is to meet with the shareholders sometimes, keep them posted on
how things are going and listen to the shareholders' feedback. The
shareholders, after all, are the bosses.
And so
that happens: Lots of managers spend lots of time meeting with
shareholders individually or in small groups, telling them how things
are going and listening to what the shareholders have to say.
Sometimes managers even
go to Carl Icahn's
apartment for dinner and a chat about buybacks. Here is an
excellent Wall
Street Journal article about the practice, which seems very
sensible and straightforward if you think about it as corporate
executives meeting with their bosses, but which is somewhat more
worrying if you think about it as managers talking secretly with
favored shareholders. These meetings, which tend to occur between
managers and the bigger shareholders, are "a booming back channel
through which facts and body language flow from public companies to
handpicked recipients." If you are not a handpicked recipient, you
might feel aggrieved.
These
meetings sometimes seem like the sort of thing that works in practice
but not in theory, though the theory is straightforward enough. There
is a Securities and Exchange Commission rule called
Regulation FD,
which "provides that when an issuer discloses material nonpublic
information to certain individuals or entities—generally, securities
market professionals, such as stock analysts, or holders of the
issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the
information—the issuer must make public disclosure of that
information." Companies can't selectively disclose material
information to particular shareholders or analysts;
material
information must be disclosed to everyone simultaneously.[2] "Material"
is a pretty vague term, but the classic
statement in the law is that for a fact to be material,
"there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."
How
does this rule fit with the fact that companies have private meetings
all the time with selected shareholders or analysts? The defense of
these meetings is typically that the company never says anything
material. But there is an obvious efficient-markets disproof of that,
which is that if these meetings weren't significant for investors the
investors wouldn't go. They're not, like, fun.
Actually it's worse than that. Not only do the investors go to the
meetings, they pay to go. From the Journal:
Invitations are doled out to money managers, hedge funds and other
investors who steer trading business to the securities firms,
which in turn provide the investors with a service called
“corporate access.”
Investors pay $1.4 billion a year for face time with executives,
consulting firm Greenwich Associates estimates based on its
surveys of money managers. The figure represents commissions
allocated by investors for corporate access when they steer trades
to securities firms. |
So
it's a $1.4 billion a year industry that provides only useless trivial
information.[3]
To me
the real upshot here is that U.S. securities law is built around the
concept of "materiality," but there is no actual concept there.
Companies must disclose "material" information broadly but can do
whatever they want with "immaterial" information, and there is no
clear distinction between the two. "Material" information is just,
unhelpfully, information that a reasonable investor would consider
significant.[4] In the
olden days this worked more or less fine: Big things were material,
little things weren't, and borderline cases went to court and the
court made a judgment call. Judges assumed they could figure out
which facts were significant and which weren't, just by looking at
them. A merger was material, though
there was debate
about when exactly merger negotiations became material. The
chief executive officer's body language in a private meeting was not
material.[5]
Obviously investors were interested in the not-material stuff, but the
law could just sort of wave that away. Here, for instance, is some
garble that the SEC said in adopting Regulation FD:
An issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece
of information to an analyst, even if, unbeknownst to the issuer,
that piece helps the analyst complete a "mosaic" of information
that, taken together, is material. Similarly, since materiality is
an objective test keyed to the reasonable investor, Regulation FD
will not be implicated where an issuer discloses immaterial
information whose significance is discerned by the analyst.
Analysts can provide a valuable service in sifting through and
extracting information that would not be significant to the
ordinary investor to reach material conclusions. We do not intend,
by Regulation FD, to discourage this sort of activity. The focus
of Regulation FD is on whether the issuer discloses material
nonpublic information, not on whether an analyst, through some
combination of persistence, knowledge, and insight, regards as
material information whose significance is not apparent to the
reasonable investor. |
What
does that mean?[6] I
think -- and hoo boy is this not legal advice -- it means that it's
okay for companies to selectively disclose information to big
sophisticated investors, as long as it's the sort of information that
only big sophisticated investors are likely to find useful. A
reasonable dentist who checks his stock portfolio once a week would be
interested in knowing about an upcoming merger, but might not want to
get into the details of a company's expected gross margin for the
upcoming quarter, or the exact terms of a customer contract renewal. A
hedge fund manager focused on the company might find those details
very meaningful indeed. That SEC paragraph sort of hints that those
details, which matter to hedge fund managers but not to "the ordinary
investor," might not be material.
Now
this is itself a weird standard: If companies can selectively disclose
information as long as it is only useful to professional investors
with keen knowledge, insight, etc., then that means that they can
favor some professional investors over others. Which does not seem
exactly, you know, fair.
But
there's another problem. Since the development of the materiality
standard, there have been major advances in computer technology and
university finance departments, and we've just gotten better at
figuring out how to isolate and quantify the value of information. In
the olden days, courts could look at a "mosaic" of information and
just see the big picture. Modern finance can examine each tile of the
mosaic, sift out the ones that came from the company and
determine their precise value. If that value isn't zero, it's gotten
harder to argue that those tiles were immaterial.
So a
judge could tell you that news of an impending merger is material, but
he might not be able to tell you whether news of a customer contract
renewal is material. A contract renewal sounds good, generically, but
the actual impact depends on the pricing and terms and other things
that it might take knowledge and insight to understand. But three
academics -- Alma Cohen, Robert Jackson and Joshua Mitts -- went
and looked at customer and supplier contract announcements
and found "that a trading strategy of buying on the date such an
agreement is struck and selling immediately before the agreement is
disclosed yields, on average, abnormal returns of 35.4 basis points."[7] So
if you met with a company, and it told you about an
about-to-be-announced customer agreement, and you bought the stock,
and sold as soon as the agreement was announced,[8]
you'd make a profit of 0.35 percent. Is that good? It hardly seems
worth it for an ordinary investor; it might well be worth it for a
hedge fund. But the point is that now we can quantify it, so it's
harder to write it off as trivial. If you can put a number on it, it
looks like an unfair advantage. "Insiders Beat Market Before Event
Disclosure: Study," was the Wall
Street Journal headline on this study. "'Trading the gap'
gives insiders a big advantage in stock trades," said the Washington
Post.[9] The
reasonable dentist might not want the details of a customer contract
renewal, but he'd take the extra 0.35 percent, thanks.
Things
get even weirder when you look at insider trading. Prosecutors tried
to send two hedge fund managers, Anthony Chiasson and Todd Newman, to
prison for 6 1/2 and 4 1/2 years, respectively, for getting nonpublic
information from Dell and Nvidia insiders. For instance, one quarter,
Chiasson and Newman
apparently learned that
Dell's "gross margin was 'looking at 17.5%' versus market expectations
of 18.3%." Would that be material to an ordinary investor? I don't
know. But prosecutors
claimed that it
was, and moreover that this sort of "detailed, pre-announcement
earnings information" was so obviously material that Chiasson and
Newman should have known it was obtained illicitly. If the insiders
leaked that information illicitly and without
corporate approval, and Chiasson and Newman knew about it,
that would be illegal insider trading.
But a
federal appeals court
reversed their
convictions,
finding that
"the evidence showed that corporate insiders at Dell and NVIDIA
regularly engaged with analysts and routinely selectively disclosed
the same type of information." So the information that prosecutors
thought was self-evidently material and illicit, a court found that
Dell and Nvidia "regularly" and "routinely" gave to
favored analysts. But whereas prosecutors wanted to put individuals in
prison for years for getting that information from company insiders,
no one seems interested in punishing the companies for giving it out
themselves as a routine matter. Is it a violation of Regulation FD? I
mean, if it was material enough that prosecutors and a jury thought it
was criminal insider trading, and yet was disclosed selectively by the
companies, then how could it not be?[10]
It sure seems like we lack a coherent theory of what companies are and
are not allowed to selectively disclose.
Now of
course you could imagine a simpler and more coherent rule. You could,
for instance, just forbid companies from meeting with
shareholders privately: Any shareholder communication would have to be
in public and available simultaneously to all shareholders.[11] This
seems to have been considered when Regulation FD was adopted, but the
Journal says that "Companies and securities firms lobbied successfully
to preserve the right to hold private meetings with investors."[12]
As
well they might! Of course companies want to have meetings with
investors. Companies sometimes need money, for one thing, and it
is much easier to persuade investors to buy your shares if you have
built some sort of personal relationship with them, or at least looked
them in the eye and shook their hand during a roadshow. And the
shareholders are, more or less, the bosses: You want to build a good
relationship with them, and listen to their suggestions, so they don't
fire you and vote in new management.[13] The
fiction that the stock market is supposed to be a level playing field
conflicts with the fiction that the shareholders own the corporation
and that the managers answer to them.
Both
of those ideas have a bit of fiction to them, but the first is the
most fantastical. Capital markets can never be fair, and professional
investors who have the time and money and resources and clout to meet
with companies will always have an informational advantage over
day-trading hobbyists. And if we expect otherwise, our rules will
always be a bit incoherent.
1.
I mean it is a useful fiction, or an approximate description of the
state of affairs, or something. Shareholders don't
literally
own the
corporation, come on. Here are Andrew
Haldane and
Lynn Stout.
2. Or
as soon as possible, if the company accidentally gives it to selected
shareholders. As happens. From the Journal:
And it is easy for companies to trip over the legal line. In April, Bebe
Stores Inc. told what it called a “select group of investors” that the
retailer was “meeting our expectations.”
The next day, Bebe, based in Brisbane, Calif., disclosed the same
comment in a securities filing, saying it had made an “inadvertent
disclosure.”
3.
We
talked last week
about the value proposition that sell-side research offers to its
customers, and this is a big part of it. There are people who dismiss
the value of sell-side research, but of course the value of sell-side
research departments is not just about their published research. If
they help big clients in other ways -- by talking to them, or by
getting them management access -- then analysts can earn their keep
even if all their recommendations are wrong. I've
mentioned before
that "You could have a model where the best thing that a research
analyst could do for
his investing clients is
put a 'buy' on every stock he covers, so as to get lots of management
access and let his clients decide for themselves."
4. I've
written before
about how the "reasonable investor" part of that definition makes no
sense in an age of algorithmic trading: If you know information that
has nothing
to do with the company,
that can still be significant to the dopey algorithms that trade its
stock, and so can still move its price -- even if no
reasonable
investor would care.
The example is that if you knew Nest was being acquired by Google, you
could buy stock in Nestor (ticker: NEST), knowing that algorithms
would see headlines to the effect of "Nest acquired by Google" and
immediately cast about for the first thing to buy. Reasonable? No.
Market-moving? Yes.
5. I
always assume "body language" is a euphemism for, like, "muttered
stock tips," but you never know. The Journal article includes the
examples of Regions Financial, which met with investors a few days
before the 2013 stress test results, "appeared 'very confident'" at
the meeting and passed the stress test a few days later; and of the
weak "body language" of J.C. Penney's CEO at an investor breakfast the
day before J.C. Penney announced a big share sale. And it quotes a
hedge fund manager saying that "You can pick up clues if you are
looking people in the eye."
6. Right
before that paragraph, the SEC says that "an issuer cannot render
material information immaterial simply by breaking it into ostensibly
non-material pieces," which sounds very precise and mathematical but
which I don't think makes any sense?
7. More
generally, they found that insiders often traded, profitably, between
the time a company did something and the time, up to four days later,
that the company disclosed it on a Form 8-K. (Form 8-K comes
with its own materiality standards, incidentally; you'd think anything
on an 8-K would be ipso facto material. But who knows.)
8. Really
just before, but how would you know that? Just after would probably be
fine.
9. "And
it’s perfectly legal," the Post headline goes on to say, though I'm
not sure why. That's exactly what is up for debate here. It is at most
imperfectly legal.
10.
One theory you could
have is that the materiality standard in Regulation FD is much more
permissive than the one in insider-trading law, because U.S.
securities law is about protecting corporations rather than about
fairness. So if someone misuses corporate information, the law will
punish him hard; but if the corporation gives out the information
illicitly, the law will look the other way. Remember,
insider trading is
about theft, not fairness. So the Journal notes:
In the past 15 years, the SEC has brought 14 enforcement actions under
Reg FD, according to Joseph Grundfest, a former SEC commissioner who
now is a professor at Stanford University.
The SEC brought
more than 14
enforcement actions for insider trading in 2014 alone.
11.
And potential shareholders? Sure why not.
12.
It goes without saying that of course securities
firms want to intermediate those meetings.
13.
Also, even if you really could ban all investor
meetings, you couldn't ban companies from meeting with anyone who
might buy their stock. If you need a bank loan, are you not allowed to
meet with a bank because it might own your stock? Are you not allowed
to meet with customers or suppliers who might buy your stock?
This column does
not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or
Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To
contact the author on this story:
Matt Levine at
mlevine51@bloomberg.net
To
contact the editor responsible for this story:
Zara Kessler at
zkessler@bloomberg.net
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