A Credit Managers
Perspective of Amazon
The Amazon Forum at
the New York Society of Security Analysts on 2/28/01
Presented by Lance Ettus
Member of the Corporate Governance
Committee
The current controversy over Amazon and its future
prospects is primarily over predictions of how suppliers will make credit
decisions. We have therefore prepared a credit analysis of Amazon.com using
a standard financial model provided by the Credit Research Foundation ("CRF")
of the National Association of Credit Managers ("NACM"), available from the
CRF web site at:
<http://www.crfonline.org/publications/freecfsa/cfsa-index.html>
The purpose of this is not to make a judgement on the
future of Amazon, but rather to see how a credit manager would view the
situation. To do our credit manager's analysis, we completed the CRF
model's spreadsheet using Amazon’s financial numbers and industry averages
for what is known as the "Altman Z test." We first took actual numbers from
1999 and 2000, put them in and got our results. We then repeated the test
to get a score for the future as predicted for the 2001 fiscal year in the
model recently published by Merrill Lynch's Henry Blodget, generally
recognized as an Amazon bull. We then used a third model, which used Mr.
Blodget’s pro forma EBIT numbers along with his projections.
The results were relatively unfavorable Altman Z scores,
for the actual periods as well as for the future based on Mr. Blodget’s
projections.
Comparative Altman
Z-Scores (1) |
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For Fiscal Years Ended
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($ In Thousands) |
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Dec 31 |
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Ratio x
Coefficient |
1999
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2000
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2001
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2002
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2003
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Working Capital/ |
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Total Assets x 1.2 |
0.13 |
0.22 |
(0.02) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Retained Earnings/ |
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Total Assets x 1.4 |
(0.50) |
(1.50) |
(2.73) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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EBIT/ |
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Total Assets x 3.3 |
(0.86) |
(1.55) |
(1.22) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Sales / |
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Total Assets x0.999 |
0.66 |
1.29 |
2.15 |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Net Worth/ |
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Total Liabs. x 0.6 |
0.07 |
(0.19) |
(0.31) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Altman Z-Score |
(0.49) |
(1.74) |
(2.14) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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And without Blodget’s forecast.
Comparative Altman
Z-Scores (1) |
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For Fiscal Years Ended
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($ In Thousands) |
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Dec 31 |
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Ratio x
Coefficient |
1999
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2000
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2001
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2002
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2003
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Working Capital/ |
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Total Assets x 1.2 |
0.13 |
0.22 |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Retained Earnings/ |
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Total Assets x 1.4 |
(0.50) |
(1.50) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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EBIT/ |
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Total Assets x 3.3 |
(0.86) |
(1.55) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Sales / |
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Total Assets x0.999 |
0.66 |
1.29 |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Net Worth/ |
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Total Liabs. x 0.6 |
0.07 |
(0.19) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Altman Z-Score |
(0.49) |
(1.74) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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And with the pro forma numbers
Comparative Altman Z-Scores (1) |
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For Fiscal Years Ended |
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($ In Thousands) |
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Dec 31 |
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Ratio x Coefficient |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
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Working Capital/ |
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Total Assets x 1.2 |
0.13 |
0.22 |
(0.02) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Retained Earnings/ |
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Total Assets x 1.4 |
(0.50) |
(1.50) |
(2.73) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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EBIT/ |
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Total Assets x 3.3 |
(0.89) |
(0.78) |
(0.40) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Sales / |
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Total Assets x0.999 |
0.66 |
1.29 |
2.15 |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Net Worth/ |
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Total Liabs. x 0.6 |
0.07 |
(0.19) |
(0.31) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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Altman Z-Score |
(0.52) |
(0.96) |
(1.32) |
#DIV/0! |
#DIV/0! |
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And here is an explanation of Altman Z.
Scale
Probability of Failure Altman
Z-score
Unlikely Z-Score = >
3.0
Undeterminable Z-Score = 1.81 to
2.99
Very High Z-Score <
1.81
(1) Altman's Z-Score is a bankruptcy prediction model
developed by Dr. Edward I. Altman of New York University in the mid-1960's.
The model assigns a coefficient to four financial ratios and sums the
resulting numerical values to arrive at the
Z-Score.
The score is then compared to the above scale as an
analytical tool to predict the probability of a firm going bankrupt.
While a low score does not guarantee bankruptcy, the
model has been proven accurate in many situations in the past and can be
used to help evaluate the overall financial position and trends of a
firm.
This is not to say that Amazon will go bankrupt, but
rather to show how a credit manager would view the company. It should be
noted that there are indeed many possible problems with the Altman Z score.
·
Some people think Altman Z scores are best used for capital intensive
industrial-type companies, and may not be suitable for Amazon even though it
is a capital intensive business.
·
The industry used as a standard of comparison could influence the
results. We used the catalog industry for an industry comparison, but could
have used any of several alternatives such as direct sales, department
stores, etc.
·
There are now more complex credit scoring systems than Altman Z, and some
of these more complex credit scoring systems could yield better results for
Amazon.
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Some of the numbers we used were rough estimates, since we had to make
some minor inferences from our data in order to transfer it into the format
of the spreadsheet.
Finally, we note that there are significant differences
between the job of a credit manager and the job of a security analyst. The
credit manager is trying to minimize risk of losses while the security
analyst is looking for excess returns. This is likely to make a credit
manager more strict with his analysis.
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