More on the
Administration’s Compensation Guidelines
Posted by Broc Romanek,
TheCorporateCounsel.net, on Saturday February 7, 2009 at
5:12 pm
(Editor’s Note:
The Administration’s compensation guidelines are available
here, and a valuable outline of the guidelines by
Davis Polk & Wardwell is available
here. Earlier posts on the compensation guidelines on this blog are
available
here and
here.)
Related to the recent
op-ed piece from Professor Bebchuk regarding the new Treasury executive
guidelines, here are key fixes to those new guidelines recommended by
Jesse Brill, Chair of CompensationStandards.com:
One key aspect of the
Obama Adminstration’s new $500,000 cap that has not gotten sufficient
attention is the unlimited amount of restricted stock and stock options
that still can be granted under the latest “restrictions.” Equity
compensation is the pay component that has gotten most out-of-line over
the past 20 years. It (as well as severance/retirement/ golden parachutes)
has caused the greatest disparity between CEO compensation and that of the
next tier of executives (and employees generally).
The new $500,000 cap
provision does prevent executives from realizing the gains in their equity
compensation until after the government is paid back. But there are two
major problems with how this applies:
1. It does not apply to
past equity compensation. Warren Buffet imposed a similar cap on Goldman
Sachs’ executives, but his restriction applies to all the equity held by
the top executives. It is not limited just to future grants, as is the
case with the new government restriction. So Buffett’s provision wisely
requires that the key decision-makers keep all their “skin in the game”
until he gets paid off.
2. Although it may help
protect the government’s investment, it is short-sighted and fails to
protect the shareholders’ best long term interests. The holding period
should be the longer of age 65 or two years following retirement. That
will ensure that the key executives make decisions that truly are in the
long-term best interests of the company (as opposed to decisions aimed at
a shorter period - after which an executive could depart, taking all his
marbles with him).Note that holding-through-retirement also addresses the
major concern about top executives’ unnecessary risk taking.
Holding equity
compensation through retirement is perhaps the single most important—and
fundamental - fix to getting executive compensation back on track because
it also addresses all the past outstanding excessive option and restricted
stock grants. And, by requiring CEOs to keep their skin in the game for
the long term, it will go a long way to restoring public trust in our
companies and our market, which is so important to restoring stability to
the markets.
Needless to say, the
fundamental hold-through-retirement fix should apply to all companies -
not just TARP financial institutions—and can be adopted at the same time
that Congress adopts say-on-pay legislation (which everyone assumes will
happen in the coming weeks. It will have much greater impact and do more
good than say-on-pay. This
November-December 2008 issue
of The Corporate Executive (which we have
posted on
CompensationStandards.com on a complimentary basis) explains why - and
how - to implement hold-through-retirement.
Here are three
additional points about the $500,000 cap:
1. Just as the $1
million cap was a major cause for the runaway increase in equity
compensation over the past decade, the new unlimited opening for
restricted stock will further exacerbate the problem. As an example, the
typical time vested restricted stock grant does not qualify for the $1
million cap “performance-based” compensation exemption, thus more
companies and shareholders will suffer the cost of the lost tax deductions
as these very large amounts vest. (So, once again the top executives will
benefit at the expense of shareholders.)
2. One reasonable fix
to the tax deductibility problem would be to require real performance
conditions (in addition to time vesting) upon the vesting of the equity.
3. To address the
“unlimited “ new grants problem, do not permit additional grants in
situations where the CEO’s total accumulated equity grants exceed the
company’s own historic internal pay equity ratios compared to the next
tiers of executives within the company.
© 2008 The
President and Fellows of Harvard College |
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