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January 4, 2024 at 2:11 PM EST
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By Matt
Levine
Matt Levine is a Bloomberg
Opinion columnist. A former investment banker at
Goldman Sachs, he was a mergers and acquisitions
lawyer at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; a clerk for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit; and an
editor of Dealbreaker.
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Money for votes
Someone sent
this to me and I can’t not share it with you:
Shareholder Vote Exchange enables
investors to trade shareholder voting rights. Passive
investors can sell their votes to raise returns and provide
additional yield. Reinvesting your earnings can also boost
your portfolio's long-term growth rate. ...
Achieve your governance or strategic
initiatives by acquiring proxy votes on Shareholder Vote
Exchange. Leveraging proxies is a cost-effective way to drive
change and maximize capital efficiency while also rewarding
other shareholders.
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As a former corporate equity derivatives
structurer I have, over the years, thought about ways to separate
shareholder voting from economic ownership, and to trade the votes
separately. One obvious set of solutions is: You are an activist hedge
fund, you buy 10 million shares of stock (which gives you the votes
and the economic ownership), and then you sell 9 million shares
through a derivative (which reduces your economic ownership but not,
generally, your voting rights). So, like, buy 10 million shares in the
cash market, and then write a 9-million-share total return swap or
put/call combo or whatever. Then you own 1 million shares
economically, but you have 10 million votes.
I think that this occasionally happens, but my
impression is that US activist hedge funds are more
likely to do the opposite, acquiring economic exposure to
more shares than they actually own. (By buying total return
swaps or call options or whatever.) This is partly for regulatory
reasons (buying a bunch of actual shares triggers disclosure and antitrust obligations
that derivatives can avoid) and partly for leverage
reasons (buying a lot of shares for cash takes a lot of cash,
while buying/selling with derivatives doesn’t take/generate as much
cash.) If you are going to spend money on research and lawyers and
proxy fights to do an activist campaign, you want a lot of economic
exposure, not just a lot of votes.
There is another set of quasi-solutions
around stock
lending: If you do not value shareholder voting at all, you can
just lend out your shares to short sellers and not recall them for
votes, which is a way of exchanging your voting rights (which you
don’t care about) for money (in the form of stock lending fees).
But I guess the most obvious solution is just,
like, go around paying retail shareholders for their votes? With some
intermediary to aggregate them and take care of the mechanics
[7] The
Shareholder Vote Exchange people are not wrong that, if someone is
willing to pay you $5 to control all your votes on all your shares for
all of this proxy season, you should take the money, because $5 is
more than zero and voting your shares is (1) worthless to you and (2)
surprisingly annoying. Retail investors stereotypically don’t
vote, and that is normally
rational, so paying them any amount of money for their votes seems
like a win for them.
On the other hand, who would pay? If it is
irrational to vote your own shares, it is even more irrational to pay
to vote someone else’s, virtually all of the time. You could imagine
some sorts of activist campaigns in which it would be expressively
valuable to buy some votes: If you submitted a nonbinding shareholder
proposal asking some company to have more, or less, diversity, then
presumably you care about sending a message, and you might feel good
about spending some of your own money to buy votes to make your
proposal look more popular.
But surely the
real high-dollar case for buying shareholder votes is in contested
proxy fights, where some activist investor has millions of dollars
on the line and wants to get its own slate of directors elected. (Also
in contested takeovers.) And there I just have trouble imagining big
activist shareholders buying votes in proxy fights this way, in part
because the disclosure and reputational issues seem like they’d be a
mess. The distinguishing feature of proxy fights and hostile takeovers
is that everyone sues everyone else about everything, and also
“bedbugs” them to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, calling
up the SEC to say “hey did you notice our opponents doing something
illegal?” Can you imagine the hay that some corporate managers would
make out of an evil activist hedge fund buying votes?
And in fact Shareholder Vote Exchange’s current
list of auctions seems to be headed by pretty routine annual
meetings for companies like Visa Inc. and Intuit Inc., none of which
have proxy fights ongoing. Still, fun idea!
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7.
I have no idea what the mechanics are here —
like, how do they make sure that the vote sellers actually vote the
way they are supposed to? — though I suspect it’s not too hard. They
say they work with a bunch of brokers’ systems. View in
article
This
column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board
or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story: Matt Levine at mlevine51@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for
this story: Wendy Pollack at wpollack@bloomberg.net
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