Washington Mutual Shows Mortgage Mess Isn't Over: Jonathan Weil

By Jonathan Weil

Oct. 31 (Bloomberg) -- If you think the worst is over for mortgage lenders, a close look at Washington Mutual Inc.'s balance sheet should dispel that notion pretty quickly.

The largest U.S. savings and loan stunned investors on Oct. 17 when it said it would set aside as much as $1.3 billion this quarter to cover anticipated loan losses. The news came the same day Washington Mutual announced a 72 percent drop in third- quarter net income to $210 million.

Since then, Washington Mutual's stock has fallen 15 percent. And at $28.11, the Seattle-based thrift now trades for only slightly more than its book value, or assets minus liabilities, while its dividend yield is a whopping 8 percent.

The signal from the market: Washington Mutual's dividend and book value aren't sustainable -- and with good reason. Washington Mutual has paid more than $1.9 billion in cash dividends over the past year, including $485 million last quarter. Meanwhile, the real wonder is that Washington Mutual's forecast for fourth-quarter loan-loss provisions wasn't substantially higher.

First, a brief accounting primer: Loan-loss allowances are the reserves that lenders set up on their balance sheets in anticipation of bad loans. Provisions are the expenses lenders record to boost their loan-loss allowances. As loans are written off, lenders record charge-offs, reducing their allowances.

For the third quarter, Washington Mutual recorded $967 million in loan-loss provisions and $421 million in net charge- offs. Those and other actions brought the company's loan-loss allowance to $1.89 billion at Sept. 30, up from $1.56 billion at June 30.

Looks Light

As for the fourth quarter, Washington Mutual predicted that provisions would be $1.1 billion to $1.3 billion and that charge-offs would increase 20 percent to 40 percent.

To see why even $1.3 billion in provisions looks light, consider Washington Mutual's $57.86 billion of so-called option- ARM loans, which make up 24 percent of Washington Mutual's loan portfolio. These adjustable-rate mortgages were popular during the housing bubble, because they give customers the option of postponing interest payments, which the lender then adds to their principal balances.

As of Sept. 30, the unpaid principal balance on Washington Mutual's option ARMs exceeded the loans' original principal amount by $1.5 billion, meaning the customers owed $1.5 billion more in principal than what they originally borrowed. By comparison, that figure was $681 million a year earlier, when Washington Mutual had $67.14 billion, or 16 percent more, option ARMs on its books.

Look to the end of 2005, and the trend becomes even starker. Back then, Washington Mutual had even more option ARMs on its balance sheet, at $71.2 billion. Yet the unpaid principal balance exceeded the original principal amount by only $160 million -- and that was up from a mere $11 million at the end of 2004.

Deferring Pain

The deferred interest from option ARMs also boosts Washington Mutual's earnings, part of a process known as negative amortization, or ``neg-am.'' That's because option-ARM lenders recognize interest income when customers postpone their interest payments, even though the lenders got no cash.

For the nine months ended Sept. 30, Washington Mutual recognized $1.05 billion in earnings as a result of neg-am within its option-ARM portfolio. That represented 7.2 percent of Washington Mutual's $14.61 billion of total interest income year-to-date. By comparison, neg-am contributed 1.8 percent of Washington Mutual's interest income for all of 2005 and just 0.2 percent for 2004.

What's going on here? Either the borrowers postponing their interest payments are doing so as a matter of choice, by and large, or they can't afford to pay them. Common sense suggests it's the latter -- and that there's serious doubt Washington Mutual ever will collect the $1.5 billion of postponed interest that its option-ARM customers have added to their original principal balances.

No Questions

Yet the $1.1 billion to $1.3 billion of fourth-quarter provisions that Washington Mutual predicted -- for the company as a whole -- wouldn't even cover the $1.5 billion of tacked-on principal. The trend among Washington Mutual's option ARMs shows no sign of slowing, either.

Through a spokeswoman, Libby Hutchinson, Washington Mutual officials declined to comment. She said the company's executives aren't fielding questions until their next meeting with investors on Nov. 7.

Then there's the bigger picture. While Washington Mutual's loan-loss allowance rose 22 percent to $1.89 billion during the 12 months ended Sept. 30, nonperforming assets rose 128 percent to $5.45 billion. So even if Washington Mutual adds $1.3 billion in provisions next quarter, its loan-loss allowance still won't be anywhere close to catching up.

To be sure, Washington Mutual executives have some latitude over the timing of the company's loan-loss provisions. Yet they also may have a monetary incentive to push losses into 2008.

Under the formula Washington Mutual's compensation committee will use to determine executive bonuses this year, 40 percent is weighted toward 2007 earnings-per-share targets, according to the company's latest proxy. Goals related to non- interest expense and non-interest income each count for 25 percent, while ``customer loyalty'' goals count for 10 percent.

Postponed Reckoning

The proxy didn't disclose the specific goals for those performance measures. Still, it stands to reason that Washington Mutual executives would come closer to hitting the EPS goal if they minimize loan losses this year.

On its Web site, Washington Mutual says the reason it no longer provides EPS forecasts to the public is that ``many believe EPS guidance tends to focus management on near-term rather than long-term performance.''

The same, of course, is true for executive bonuses that are tied heavily to yearly EPS targets. If Washington Mutual's management is more focused on near-term performance now, as the numbers suggest, this might help explain it.

To contact the writer of this column: Jonathan Weil in Boulder, Colorado, at jweil6@bloomberg.net

Last Updated: October 31, 2007 00:14 EDT