Managing the Narrative: Investor
Relations Officers and Corporate Disclosure
Posted by Andy Call (Arizona State
University), on Tuesday, October 23, 2018
Editor’s Note:
Andy Call is Professor of Accounting at Arizona State
University W.P. Carey School of Business. This post is based on a
recent
article forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting &
Economics authored by Prof. Call;
Lawrence D. Brown, Seymour Wolfbein Professor of Accounting at
Temple University Fox School of Business;
Michael B. Clement, KPMG Centennial Professor of Accounting at
University of Texas McCombs School of Business; and
Nathan Y. Sharp, Associate Professor of Accounting at Texas
A&M University Mays Business School. |
Although investor relations officers (IROs) play an
important role in managing corporate communications with important stakeholders
and in helping their companies achieve an appropriate valuation, the academic
literature on investor relations is only in its early stages. IROs are
responsible for communicating with the investment community and shaping the
company narrative. As a result, IROs interact regularly with sell-side analysts
and institutional investors and are at the center of many disclosure-related
activities, including quarterly earnings conference calls and press releases,
among others. In fact, because they manage so many important corporate
disclosure activities, IROs are frequently referred to as “chief disclosure
officers.”
We survey 610 IROs of publicly traded U.S. companies and interview
14 IROs to better understand their roles in managing companies’
communications with sell-side analysts and institutional investors and
in overseeing corporate disclosures. Our survey explores numerous
topics for which IROs are uniquely qualified to provide valuable
insights, including: the reasons, settings, timing, and value of IROs’
interactions with sell-side analysts and institutional investors; how
IROs control outsiders’ access to senior management; how sell-side
analysts help IROs convey their company’s message to institutional
investors; the value of various types of disclosures for communicating
the company narrative; the role of IROs (vis-à-vis the role of CFOs)
in preparing various disclosures; planning for and managing public
earnings conference calls; the size and composition of the conference
call queue; private “call-backs” after public earnings calls; the
determinants of IROs’ internal performance ratings; and IROs’
experiences with Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD).
The results of our
study yield three primary takeaways. First, our study speaks to the value,
nature, and timing of private communication between IROs,
analysts, and investors. We find that IROs consider private phone calls to be
more important than sell-side analysts, 10-K/10-Q reports, management earnings
forecasts, and on-site visits for conveying their company’s message to
institutional investors. About 40% of IROs indicate that private phone calls
with members of the investment community after the earnings release but
before the public earnings conference call starts are at least somewhat
important, and some IROs we interviewed suggested these private calls help
management prepare for the public call. In addition, over 80% of companies
routinely conduct private “call-backs” with institutional investors and
sell-side analysts after public earnings conference calls. While company
management is unlikely to allow institutional investors to ask questions during
the public earnings conference call, they typically give priority to
investors—particularly those with a large holding in the company’s stock—for
private “call-backs” after the conclusion of the public call.
Second, our findings
shed light on the significant influence IROs have on corporate disclosures. We
find that IROs have significant input on all forms of company disclosures, with
nearly 70% of IROs reporting they have considerable influence on the substance
and form of press releases and about 84% saying the same about the prepared
remarks of public earnings conference calls. IROs also believe certain forms of
disclosure (e.g., public earnings conference calls, road shows, press releases)
are more important than others (e.g., 8-K reports, on-site visits), which
suggests they are more likely to utilize these disclosure channels to
communicate with analysts and investors. As the primary gatekeepers who control
access to senior management, IROs indicate that they are more likely to grant
requests for access to senior management—a private disclosure channel—to
analysts with a long history of covering their company and to investors who work
for a large investment firm than to Institutional Investor All-Star
analysts or investors who work for a hedge fund. IROs significantly shape the
preparation, execution, and post-call activities that surround companies’ public
earnings conference calls, and they prioritize institutional investors with a
large stake in their company and experienced analysts for private “call-backs”
during the very important period of time immediately following public earnings
conference calls.
Finally, several survey
responses suggest public earnings conference calls—even the Q&A portion—often
involve more “theater” than prior research has documented. Specifically, most
IROs indicate that giving them an idea ahead of time of what questions to expect
on the upcoming call is an important service sell-side analysts provide.
Further, IROs say that important ways they prepare for conference calls include
developing a script, preparing a list of possible questions and answers,
developing a strategy for handling unanticipated questions, and rehearsing the
call. Our interviews with IROs suggest that institutional investors who do not
wish to speak publicly on conference calls—and thereby “reveal their hand”—use
text messages or instant messaging to send their questions to sell-side
analysts, who then ask the questions as if they were their own. The IROs we
surveyed indicate that public earnings conference calls are the single most
important tool for conveying the company message to institutional investors,
which helps explain the desire of company management to carefully manage every
aspect of these calls.
Our study offers
numerous other findings that make unique contributions to the literature. For
example, we provide evidence on the role of investors in “walking down”
sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts, and we shed light on the dual roles IROs
play as both messengers for senior management and recipients of feedback from
the investment community. Our results also provide evidence of managers’
reservations about interacting with hedge funds, and their ongoing caution about
avoiding potential violations of Reg FD.
While prior studies on
investor relations have made important strides by focusing on the benefits and
consequences of IR programs, our survey results shed new light on the
process of investor relations—how IROs perform their jobs, both in general
and specifically as it relates to their interactions with sell-side analysts and
institutional investors. Thus, our study improves our understanding of how IROs
communicate the company narrative to important stakeholders. The insights we
obtain about the process of investor relations would be difficult to obtain
without conducting a survey.
We also provide new
insights into IROs’ influence on corporate disclosures. While prior research has
examined the role of CEOs and CFOs on corporate disclosure decisions, our
findings indicate that IROs also have considerable influence over corporate
disclosure, and that their performance is evaluated in large part based on their
ability to manage these disclosures. Further, our findings on the usefulness of
public earnings conference calls and private “call-backs” speak to the
importance of supplementing written disclosures (e.g., 10-Ks, 8-Ks, management
guidance) with these other interactions that help the firm “manage the
narrative.”
Our study also adds to
the literature by providing insights from company management on public earnings
conference calls, which have generally been studied from the perspective of
analysts or institutional investors. For example, by documenting the relative
importance of activities before (i.e., advance notice of questions that will be
asked, preparing a list of possible questions and answers), during (i.e.,
managing the queue), and after (i.e., private “call-backs”) earnings conference
calls, we provide a rich understanding of the dynamics involved in this
important disclosure event as well as new details about the nature, timing, and
frequency of management’s private communication with members of the investment
community after the conclusion of the public call.
The complete paper is
available for download
here.
Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
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